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 1 
LEAD ARTICLE 
 
A LINGUISTIC CRITIQUE 
OF TAG JURISDICTION:  
JUSTICE SCALIA AND THE ZOMBIE METONYMY 
ANDREA COLES-BJERRE* 
This Article takes an innovative linguistic and cognitive perspective in order 
to construct a fresh critique of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Burnham v. Superior 
Court, which famously upholds “tag jurisdiction” based merely on a 
defendant’s transient presence in the forum state.  Presence in the forum state, 
this Article demonstrates, was likely never anything more than a subconscious 
cognitive device—a metonymy—for more abstract and fairness-based concepts 
like the minimum contacts standard separately developed by the Supreme Court 
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.  Metonymy is a common and 
useful tool that assists people’s thought processes in law as in everyday life, and 
judges of an earlier era were justified in using it.  But justice demands that law 
must mature over time, much like an individual’s own thought processes do, 
outgrowing metonymies that have ceased to be useful.  Thus, in Burnham, 
Justice Scalia should have recognized the cognitive origins of the presence-in-
forum criterion, instead of complacently accepting the presence-in-forum 
criterion as inherently persuasive.  This Article poses a radical challenge to 
Burnham that goes far beyond policy arguments and into the linguistic roots 
of judicial thought.  With Justice Gorsuch replacing Justice Scalia on the bench, 
will Burnham be buried, or will its outdated metonymic reasoning continue to 
lurch zombie-like onward? 
                                               
 *  Associate Professor, University of Oregon School of Law.  For helpful comments 
and guidance, I thank Kevin Clermont, Antonio Barcelona, Eric Pederson, and Carl 
Bjerre.  Thanks also to participants at the Stockholm Metaphor Festival’s workshop on 
topics in metonymy, the West Coast Regional Conference on Language and Law, and 
the Law and Society Annual Meeting in Honolulu. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“What, then, is truth?  A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and 
anthropomorphisms—in short, a sum of human relations, which 
have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and 
rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and 
obligatory to a people . . . .” 
—Friedrich Nietzsche1 
 
This Article brings a powerful new perspective to well-known 
doctrinal developments in United States personal jurisdiction law, with 
a particular focus on Justice Scalia’s notorious opinion in Burnham v. 
Superior Court,2 which famously upholds “tag jurisdiction” against 
                                               
 1. Friedrich Nietzsche, On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, in THE PORTABLE 
NIETZSCHE 46–47 (Walter Kaufmann ed., trans., 1954) (1873). 
 2. 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (plurality opinion). 
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constitutional challenge.3  This Article uses insights from cognitive 
linguistics to show that the Burnham opinion is best understood as the 
unjustified perpetuation of a metonymy by which a person’s physical 
presence in a jurisdiction is used as a convenient, but inexact, 
approximation for the person’s contacts with that jurisdiction. 
Metonymy is a very pervasive linguistic and cognitive device, used by 
all human beings in our daily thinking—including judges.  Metonymy 
subconsciously affords mental access to one entity or concept, by 
means of reference to another entity or concept, with the latter often 
being more convenient or easily articulable.  To take just one example, 
a newscaster might report that “the White House today announced a 
new such-and-such policy,” even though the building on Pennsylvania 
Avenue obviously did not itself make any announcement at all.  The 
newscaster’s expression instantiates a PLACE FOR INHABITANTS 
metonymy, with the place (the White House) being articulated in 
order to signify its inhabitants (the policymakers); or, a CONTROLLED 
FOR CONTROLLER metonymy, with the controlled entity (the building) 
being articulated in order to signify the controller entity (the 
policymakers in the building).4 
The metonymy that Justice Scalia’s Burnham opinion rests on can 
conveniently be called PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS.  This Article shows that 
when PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS was initially developed as a mental 
phenomenon by judges of earlier generations, it was perfectly justifiable 
and even entirely natural.  But by the time of Burnham, intervening social 
developments had rendered the PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS metonymy 
outdated, and, rather than perpetuating it,  Justice Scalia should have 
abandoned it.  In particular, the vastly greater ease and frequency of 
travel in our modern age has made it much more common for 
defendants to be physically present in a jurisdiction without any relevant 
contacts.  The PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS metonymy should, therefore, 
have been recognized for what this Article now shows it was, and 
subjected to modern due process standards.   
It is well established that Justice Scalia’s Burnham opinion fits poorly 
with the Supreme Court’s evolution from a physically-based 
jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction—exemplified by the nineteenth 
                                               
 3. Id. at 612, 622 (alluding to “tag jurisdiction” as jurisdiction based on personal 
service upon a physically present defendant, regardless of the duration of the defendant’s 
presence or whether the cause of action was related to her activities in the state). 
 4. See Günter Radden & Zoltán Kövecses, Towards a Theory of Metonymy, in 4 METONYMY 
IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 39, 40–41 (Klaus-Uwe Panther & Günter Radden eds., 1999). 
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century landmark case, Pennoyer v. Neff,5 which required service of 
process while the defendant is present in the forum state—to the more 
abstract and conceptual approach to personal jurisdiction announced 
by International Shoe Co. v. Washington.6  This Article analogizes this 
doctrinal evolution to a second linguistic and conceptual phenomenon, 
namely the maturation of children into adults.  Law is a form of what 
scholars call “distributed cognition,” enabling the judges of the present 
day to learn from the judges of the past, and thus enabling the law itself 
to mature over time.7  Researchers in linguistics have shown that 
children use metonymies because of their relatively scant vocabularies 
and life experience8 and by analogy, the judges of the pre-Pennoyer era 
were justified in using presence as a metonymy for contacts.  But, under 
this same analogy, Justice Scalia should have benefited from the greater 
experience of the modern judicial age and freed himself from the no 
longer justified PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS metonymy. 
The point of this Article is not that social evolution has rendered 
Scalia’s Burnham opinion unsound as a doctrinal or policy matter.  
Rather, the point is linguistic and jurisprudential.  Perhaps even the 
pre-Pennoyer judges who first developed the service-while-present-in-
forum-state test, if they had had the historical experience enabling 
them to distinguish between presence and effects, would have tended 
to formulate their rule in the more supple terms that International Shoe 
suggests.  The pre-Pennoyer judges would have acknowledged that what 
really matters for purposes of personal jurisdiction is the nature and 
degree of the defendant’s contacts with the forum, and that 
jurisdiction based on service within the jurisdiction must accordingly 
be limited—just as in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction were limited 
in Shaffer v. Heitner.9  But, because the pre-Pennoyer judges lacked that 
historical experience, they filled the gaps with the PRESENCE FOR 
                                               
 5. 95 U.S. 714 (1878), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 168 (1977). 
 6. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 7. See Jennifer Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science:  Expert Evidence and the 
Confrontation Clause, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 151 (2012) (explaining that “distributed 
cognition” allows groups of individuals to produce knowledge that would be unavailable 
to any single individual). 
 8. Brigitte Nerlich et al., “Mummy, I Like Being a Sandwich”:  Metonymy in Language 
Acquisition, in 4 METONYMY IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 361, 362–63 (Klaus-Uwe 
Panther & Günter Radden eds., 1999) (illustrating how metonymy is an “abbreviation 
device” used by children to overextend their vocabulary and by adults for “cost-
effective communication”). 
 9. 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977) (holding that in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction must 
also be justified by the minimum contacts standard established in International Shoe). 
2018] A LINGUISTIC CRITIQUE OF TAG JURISDICTION 5 
 
CONTACTS metonymy.  And, in Burnham, Justice Scalia relied on the 
same metonymy despite having the greater historical experience that 
should have enabled him to see beyond it.10  With the recent turning over 
of Justice Scalia’s seat on the Court, it is time to abolish the PRESENCE FOR 
CONTACTS metonymy once and for all—but the outlook for this is not 
bright, given what we know of Justice Gorsuch’s style of judicial reasoning. 
The law of personal jurisdiction is currently undergoing a great deal 
of ferment.  To name just three significant developments, the Supreme 
Court has issued a spate of important opinions on both the general 
and the specific aspects of personal jurisdiction;11 scale-tipping 
Burnham author Justice Antonin Scalia has died and been replaced on 
the bench by Neil Gorsuch;12 and under the auspices of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, the once-dormant 
negotiations for a treaty on the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments have gained new life and momentum.13  All of these 
developments bring new urgency to the question of Burnham’s 
legitimacy.  But this Article’s primary purpose is not to argue against 
that legitimacy on mere policy grounds; instead, this Article takes a 
more archeological approach, exploring the origins of tag jurisdiction 
for the sake of the light those origins shed on judicial thinking in 
general (and human cognition in general).  The result is indeed a new 
                                               
 10. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 617–22 (1990) (plurality opinion). 
 11. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 
(2017) (declining to extend specific jurisdiction to non-residents of California who 
suffered the same injuries as California residents); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 
117, 135–40 (2014) (rejecting general jurisdiction where the in-state contacts of a 
foreign corporation’s U.S. subsidiary were insufficient to render the corporation “at 
home in the forum state” (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 
564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011))); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 288–89 (2014) (rejecting 
specific jurisdiction after finding that the lower court improperly focused its analysis 
on the defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiffs’ connection to the forum rather than 
the defendant’s own contacts with the forum); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 920 (2011) (rejecting general jurisdiction where a 
products manufactured by a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. corporation “reached the 
forum state through the “stream of commerce” and the complaint is unrelated to those 
contacts); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 886 (2011) (plurality 
opinion) (instructing that courts should consider a foreign corporation’s purposeful 
contacts with the forum state, not with the United States itself).  The bearing of these 
cases on this Article is shown infra 124 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 220–239 and accompanying text (illustrating why Gorsuch is 
likely to perpetuate tag jurisdiction). 
 13. See The Judgments Project, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L. https://www.hcch.net/en 
/projects/legislative-projects/judgments (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (describing recent 
and upcoming negotiations); infra notes 216–219 and accompanying text. 
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attack on Burnham, but this is a favorable side-effect of an inquiry that 
is already jurisprudentially valuable and exciting on its own. 
I.    BACKGROUND ON PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is a set of limitations on the power of a court.  As the 
roots of the word “jurisdiction” suggest, these limitations concern a 
court’s power to “say law”—to pronounce an authoritative outcome in 
adjudicating a dispute.14  More specifically, “personal jurisdiction” is 
the court’s power of “law saying” over the person of the defendant, and 
over the defendant’s rights and property, by issuing a legally 
enforceable judgment against the defendant.15  The in personam 
branch of personal jurisdiction is one subset of a court’s territorial 
authority to adjudicate, with another subset being the in rem branch of 
personal jurisdiction.16  For clarity of exposition, this Part concentrates 
on in personam jurisdiction, as this is the branch of territorial authority 
with which Burnham deals.17 
When a court has in personam, as opposed to in rem personal 
jurisdiction, the court has the power to issue a judgment against the 
defendant that can affect any or all of the defendant’s assets.18  The 
issuance of a civil judgment against a person is one of the most direct 
and dramatic instances, outside of the criminal law context, in which 
the power of the state is exercised against a person.  An armed officer 
of the state will come and seize the assets that the defendant then 
owns—land, bank accounts, jewelry—or that the defendant may own in 
the future, like future wage payments or inheritances, and keep collecting 
these assets until the judgment is satisfied.  It is no surprise that this 
exercise of governmental authority is controlled, in the United States, by 
the Constitution, specifically its Due Process Clause.19  And just as in other 
                                               
 14. See Jurisdiction, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (showing that 
“jurisdiction” derives from the Latin dicere, “to say”). 
 15. See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE:  TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND 
VENUE 7 (1st ed. 1999) (elaborating that an in personam judgment can “diminish[] 
the personal rights of a party in favor of another party”). 
 16. See id. at 7–8.  Unlike in rem jurisdiction, in personam jurisdiction can result 
in the imposition of personal liability or obligation upon the defendant.  Id.  In rem 
jurisdiction is “[t]heoretically and formally” an action against a thing to determine the 
interests of persons in that thing.  Id. at 8. 
 17. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 607, 609–10 (1990) (plurality opinion). 
 18. In contrast, a court with in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction generally has power 
only over certain of the defendant’s assets.  See infra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 19. Where the power of the states rather than the federal government is at issue, as 
in most questions of state-court jurisdiction, the Due Process Clause is that of the 
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aspects of constitutional law, judges have altered the meaning and 
application of this aspect of the Due Process Clause over the decades.  
Oliver Wendell Holmes declared that “[t]he foundation of 
jurisdiction is physical power.”20  This Article’s concern is not about the 
fairness, constitutionality, or other jurisprudential desirability of tag 
jurisdiction, as distinct from the soundness, or lack thereof, of the 
reasoning in Scalia’s Burnham opinion.  Nonetheless, I readily 
acknowledge that I am in sympathy with the anti-Holmesian arguments 
of Albert Ehrenzweig21 and more recently, Kevin Clermont,22 to the 
                                               
Fourteenth Amendment:  “No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918–19 (2011) (stating 
that personal jurisdiction is controlled by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause because exercising jurisdiction “exposes defendants to the State’s coercive power” 
(citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945))). 
 20. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).  A fuller version of the quotation 
is interesting as a venerable statement of the basic service-while-in-the-forum rule that 
would later be asserted as supporting tag jurisdiction: 
The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power, although in civilized times it 
is not necessary to maintain that power throughout proceedings properly begun, 
and although submission to the jurisdiction by appearance may take the place 
of service upon the person.  No doubt there may be some extension of the 
means of acquiring jurisdiction beyond service or appearance, but the 
foundation should be borne in mind.  Subject to its conception of sovereignty 
even the common law required a judgment not to be contrary to natural 
justice.  And in States bound together by a Constitution and subject to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, great caution should be used not to let fiction deny 
the fair play that can be secured only by a pretty close adhesion to fact. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  The case involved a defendant who had been 
served by publication in the forum state after leaving that forum state with an intent to 
establish domicile elsewhere.  Id.  The opinion holds the service invalid.  Id. at 93. 
 21. See generally Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction:  The 
“Power” Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).  Ehrenzweig methodically 
attacks Holmes’s power principle quoted above, calling it “both factually unsupported 
and functionally unsupportable under modern conditions.”  Id. at 296. 
  Apparently unnoticed by Ehrenzweig is that Holmes himself, at the end of the 
same paragraph in which he declares the importance of physical power, invokes the “fair 
play” that physical power implicates.  See supra note 20.  When we remember that the 
Court in McDonald v. Mabee found jurisdiction not to exist because service by publication 
was not sufficient on those facts, the Holmesian declaration emerges as just dictum.  It is 
easy to make absolutist statements about physical power when no such physical power is 
involved in the case.  Still less, of course, is McDonald v. Mabee a tag jurisdiction case. 
 22.  
  The United States, prompted by the inherent tensions among states in a 
federation, early adopted a theory of exclusive power based on territoriality. 
The theory originated with the seventeenth-century Dutch theorist Ulric 
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effect that personal jurisdiction has always been—and should be—
limited by factors other than the raw power of a sovereign to control 
events within its borders.  My linguistic or cognitive hypothesis 
presumably has the effect of bolstering the descriptive dimension of 
Ehrenzweig’s and Clermont’s, and I welcome this fact. 
In fact, “power” can be an ambiguous concept, and in law we must 
be careful to distinguish its two possible main meanings.  In some 
contexts, the word “power” refers simply to raw physical ability:  an 
Olympic weight lifter has the power to lift a 190-kilogram barbell; a 
lawfully arrested suspect with training from Houdini may have the 
power to escape her handcuffs; and a sovereign has the power to 
exercise force over persons within its territory.  Judging from Holmes’s 
careful reference to “physical power,”23 this first sense is evidently the 
one he had in mind (and against which Ehrenzweig and Clermont 
clearly argue).  But in other contexts, the word “power” may refer to 
physical ability as limited or circumscribed by rightfulness.24  For 
example a debate about, say, the constitutionality of torture may often 
                                               
Huber, who contended that each sovereign had jurisdiction, exclusive of all 
other sovereigns' jurisdictions, to bind persons and things present within its 
territorial boundaries. However, the principal thrust of the U.S. power theory 
was not authorization, not a delineation of the outer bounds of actual 
sovereign power. True, courts used the theory to justify nonrecognition of 
judgments of foreign courts lacking jurisdiction. More significantly, though, 
courts used the theory to impose self-limitation, to specify when the 
sovereign should choose not to exercise its actual power. After all, any full 
sovereign had the raw power to adjudicate any dispute when and how it 
pleased, as well as the power to enforce its adjudication on persons and 
things over which it eventually acquired physical power. Yet, sovereigns did 
not act this way. Jurisdictional law was a limit on how far the sovereign would 
reach to exercise its existing power, a limit imposed not only in the hope that 
other sovereigns would restrain themselves similarly, but also increasingly 
with the intuition that such restraint was fair. In other words, the power 
theory never linked to raw power, but served merely as a metaphorical label 
for jurisdictional actualities. Accordingly, power was never the true rationale 
of U.S. jurisdiction in any realistic sense. The true rationale was always the 
desirable allocation of jurisdictional authority. 
See Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 
89, 99–100 (1999) [hereinafter Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation]; see also CLERMONT, 
supra note 15, at 6–7 (“Jurisdictional law was a limit on how far the sovereign would 
reach to exercise its existing power, a limit imposed . . . increasingly with the intuition 
that such restraint was fair.”). 
 23. McDonald, 243 U.S. at 91 (emphasis added). 
 24. See Carl S. Bjerre, Mental Capacity as Metaphor, 18 INT’L J. FOR SEMIOTICS L. 101, 116–
18 (2005) (discussing locutions such as “can do” and “can’t do” as expressions of moral 
authority that are metaphorical borrowings from the domain of raw physical ability). 
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be framed in terms of whether the government “has the power” to 
carry out the actions in question, but the substance of that debate is of 
course about the rightfulness of the actions—not the government’s 
physical ability to carry out those actions.  (Everyone grimly concedes 
that the government has the personnel and tools and locations needed 
to do the job.)  Ehrenzweig and Clermont might say, and I would 
agree, that power in the first sense is an inadequate basis for the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction, while power in the second sense is 
simply a convenient label for whatever our legal system determines the 
adequate bases for the exercise of personal jurisdiction to be.  In this 
Article, I will use power in the first sense. 
Section I.A examines the earlier vision, exemplified by Pennoyer; 
Section I.B explains the later vision, announced by Shaffer; and Section 
I.C shows how Burnham presents a conflict between the two visions.  
Schematizing greatly for convenience of discussion, the law has 
embraced two different visions of the Due Process limitations on 
personal jurisdiction:  an earlier vision based solely on power, and a 
later vision according to which power is tempered by the additional 
requirement of reasonableness.  
A.   Pennoyer and Power as the Sole Criterion 
The earlier articulation of the scope of personal jurisdiction comes 
from the Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff.  The case declares that the 
constitutional root of personal jurisdiction is the court’s power over 
the defendant (or, in the case of actions in rem or quasi in rem, the 
court’s power over the defendant’s property), and it treats physical 
location as being the determinant of whether that power exists.25  The 
basis of power at issue in Pennoyer, and of principal concern in this 
Article, is that the defendant must be served with process while present 
within the forum state.26 
                                               
 25. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 730–31, 733–34 (1878), overruled in part by 
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 168 (1977). 
 26. Id. at 734–36.  There are other bases of power that are beyond the scope of this 
Article.  See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 464 (1940) (finding power over a 
defendant domiciled in the forum state); York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15, 21 (1890) (finding 
power over a defendant who voluntarily appeared in the proceeding); Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 
at 735 (noting that a court has power over a defendant who appointed an agent in the 
forum for service of process); Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, 
and the Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1382 (2015) (discussing various forms 
of implied consent to jurisdiction).  Power in an in rem or quasi in rem case based on 
the defendant’s property being located in the forum state is discussed infra notes 72–74 
10 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1 
 
Part of what is confusing about Pennoyer is that it is a case about a 
case.27  Case One serves as a kind of prologue, generating the judgment 
and other procedural facts that later come to be at issue in Pennoyer 
itself, which is Case Two.  Correspondingly, Case Two is a collateral 
attack on the validity of the judgment in Case One.28 
In Case One, an Oregon lawyer, Mitchell, sued his client, Neff, in 
Oregon state court for attorney’s fees.29  Neff lived in California and 
did not happen to be in Oregon at the time, so Mitchell could not serve 
Neff within Oregon’s borders,30 and instead he sued Neff by publishing 
the summons in a newspaper as directed by the court.31  Neff did not 
respond to the summons, presumably because he was not reading the 
Oregon newspapers and so did not know about the summons, and 
hence Neff defaulted in the lawsuit, so that Mitchell won a judgment 
against him.32  Mitchell turned this judgment into an actual financial 
recovery in the same way that winners of judgments often do:  he 
executed the judgment by having the sheriff seize and sell property 
                                               
and accompanying text.  Jurisdiction limited to persons’ status, for example a declaration 
of divorce, is recognized in Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 735, and might be analogized to 
jurisdiction in rem.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 7 (AM. LAW INST. 
1982) (“A state may exercise jurisdiction to establish or terminate a status if the status 
has a sufficient relationship to the state.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 
§ 71 (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (“A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to dissolve 
the marriage of spouses one of whom is domiciled in the state.”). 
 27. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719–20. 
 28. Id. at 719, 721–22, 736. 
 29. Id. at 719–20. 
 30. Id. at 716–20. 
 31. See id. at 720.  The Oregon statute at the time permitted service by publication 
on the facts of this case.  It provided in pertinent part: 
When service of the summons cannot be made [in person within the state], 
and the defendant after due diligence cannot be found within the state, and 
when that fact appears by affidavit to the satisfaction of the court or judge 
thereof, and it in like manner appears that a cause of action exists against the 
defendant . . . such court or judge may grant an order that the service be made 
by publication of summons . . . [w]hen the defendant is not a resident of the state but 
has property therein, and the court has jurisdiction of the subject of the action. 
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND OTHER GENERAL STATUTES OF OREGON ENACTED IN 1862, 
at 14–15 (1863) (emphasis added) (repealed 1979); see also Pike v. Kennedy, 15 P. 637, 
638 (Or. 1887).  Neff was not a resident of Oregon but did own property there, namely 
the real estate against which Mitchell later had the sheriff execute.  Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 
at 714.  The “court ha[ving] jurisdiction of the subject of the action” presumably refers 
to subject-matter rather than territorial jurisdiction, and most state trial courts are 
courts of general jurisdiction, so this aspect of the statute was not an issue.  Id. at 720. 
 32. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719–20. 
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owned by Neff (in this case a tract of land in Oregon).33  Mitchell got 
the money from the sale of the land, and a third-party buyer named 
Pennoyer got the land.34 
In Case Two, Neff sued Pennoyer in federal court to get the land 
back.35  Neff had been given the land by the U.S. government as part 
of the government’s efforts to “settle” the West, and the property could 
now belong to Pennoyer instead of Neff only if the sheriff’s sale—and 
thus the judgment—in Case One was valid.  The lower court in Case 
Two ruled in Neff’s favor:  the judgment in Case One was not valid, for 
peripheral reasons that will not detain us here.  Pennoyer appealed but 
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision on broad 
grounds.36  Much of the Supreme Court’s opinion, by Justice Field, is 
a hymn in praise of territoriality.37  According to the opinion, the 
Oregon court in Case One could not reach Neff in personam because 
he had been served outside the state.38  It is “a principle of general, if 
not universal, law” that “[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily 
restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is 
established.”39  Two “well-established principles of public law 
respecting the jurisdiction of an independent State over persons and 
property” are, first, that “every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction 
and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory,” and, 
second and conversely, that “no State can exercise direct jurisdiction 
and authority over persons or property without its territory.”40 
Expressed in this way, the Court’s emphasis on territorial exclusivity 
might be seen primarily as a matter of harmonious relations between 
the several sovereign states, rather than as a matter of individual rights.  
But Justice Field proceeded to bolster his holding with dictum based on 
individual rights under the newly-adopted Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process clause.41 
                                               
 33. Id. at 719. 
 34. Id. at 719–20. 
 35. Id. at 719. 
 36. See id. at 732–34. 
 37. See id. at 720, 723 (explicating the role of territoriality in jurisdictional debates 
and applying those principles). 
 38. Id. at 726, 736. 
 39. Id. at 720. 
 40. Id. at 722. 
 41. Id. at 733.  Relying on this dictum, Justice Field declared that the Fourth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires that in personam jurisdiction only be 
exercised by a competent court and after the defendant is served process within the state 
or voluntarily appears.  Id. Fifty years later, in Hess v. Pawloski, the Court summarized 
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We can say that Pennoyer thus made in-state service of process 
constitutionally necessary for in personam jurisdiction (absent the 
other bases of jurisdiction).  But it is crucial to note that making in-
state service constitutionally necessary is different from making it 
constitutionally sufficient.  Service on Neff while he was outside of 
Oregon was not enough to support in personam jurisdiction—but 
would service on Neff while he was inside Oregon automatically have 
been enough?  Even if Neff were there only for a short time?  Even if 
he were just passing through on the way to Seattle?  Even if he were 
drawn into Oregon more or less against his will, for example by 
compelling personal circumstances such as the illness of a close 
relative?  These sufficiency questions are what the constitutionality of 
tag jurisdiction is all about.42  Pennoyer is silent on them, and the 
Supreme Court would not rule on these sufficiency questions until 
over a century had passed, in Shaffer v. Heitner and the case of central 
concern to this Article, Burnham.43 
At this point, one should also take note that the in-state service 
requirement, whether necessary or sufficient, has a blatantly physical 
nature.  It centers on the individual defendant’s flesh-and-blood body and 
how it relates to a certain geographical boundary at a certain time.  The 
body is either within the boundary, or it is not.  Part II below demonstrates 
that physicality of this sort is a very important attribute of metonymy.44 
                                               
Pennoyer’s teaching as follows:  “The process of a court of one State cannot run into 
another and summon a party there domiciled to respond to proceedings against him.  
Notice sent outside the State to a non-resident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in an 
action against him personally for money recovery.”  274 U.S. 352, 355 (1927). 
 42. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 611–13 (1990) (plurality 
opinion) (noting that most states uphold tag jurisdiction where the defendant was only 
briefly in the state, unless the defendant is brought into the forum by fraud or force). 
 43. On the other hand, during this interim and heightening the importance of 
the topic, other courts apparently did treat in-state service of process as being sufficient 
for in personam jurisdiction, that is, they did treat tag jurisdiction as being legitimate.  
See Ehrenzweig, supra note 21.  Ehrenzweig writes that before Pennoyer, “[f]orum 
conveniens—to use an unusual, but I believe helpful, phrase—was . . . the basis of all 
personal jurisdiction.”  Id. at 292.  He goes on to argue that “only” with Pennoyer: 
when transient service [i.e. tag jurisdiction], hitherto a harmless adjunct of 
convenient jurisdiction, thus came to be required for the establishment of 
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, did such service also become 
generally sufficient for this purpose . . . .  The common law and common sense 
jurisdiction of the forum conveniens yielded to a dogmatic rule of personal 
service precariously balanced by a doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
Id. 
 44. See infra Part II. 
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B.    International Shoe, Shaffer,  
and Reasonableness as a Separate Criterion 
With the arrival and roaring progress of the twentieth century, 
dramatic advancements in communication and transportation made it 
possible for a defendant to have a significant impact in a state, or on a 
plaintiff within that state, without necessarily being physically present 
there.45  The defendant’s effects within the state (or “contacts” with the 
state)46 readily cross borders even when the defendant herself does 
not.  In keeping with the purposive nature of judging, the Supreme 
Court gradually accommodated these historical developments by 
shifting in personam jurisdiction from the single-criterion approach, 
just described, to a much more nuanced dual-criterion approach with 
which it still struggles today.47  For purposes of this schematized 
discussion, one may say that the dual-criterion approach is more 
abstract than the single-criterion approach in two ways.  First, the dual-
criterion approach no longer focuses solely on the simple physical 
question of whether the defendant is present in the forum state when 
served with process;48 instead, it focuses on all of the contacts between 
the defendant and the jurisdiction—whether or not the defendant is 
present there at any time.49  And second (and more significant for 
purposes of this Article), the dual-criterion approach evaluates those 
contacts by a new standard of reasonableness, which is imposed in 
addition to the requirement of power.50 
                                               
 45. See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957) (claiming that 
conducting business by mail “fundamental[ly] transfor[med]” the national economy 
by allowing individuals to engage with parties “separated by the full continent”). 
 46. The term “contacts” in this context is metaphorical, as opposed to 
metonymical.  See infra Section II.A. 
 47. See Kevin M. Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and 
Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 423 (1981) (delineating that, when courts 
determine state court jurisdiction, they first “categorize the action” and then “apply 
both the power and the reasonableness tests”). 
 48. Id. (illustrating how International Shoe’s minimum contacts approach has 
weakened Pennoyer’s rigid physical-power jurisdictional approach). 
 49. Id. at 423–24 (explaining that the “metaphorical basis” of purposefully-
directed minimum contacts expands the basis of personal jurisdiction beyond physical 
presence, domicile, or consent). 
 50. See id. at 424 (explaining that courts should consider the interests of the 
defendant, plaintiff, and forum state to determine whether jurisdiction is reasonable). 
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Others have delved into the intermediate evolutionary stages,51 but 
for purposes of this discussion, the first important post-Pennoyer point 
of reference is International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington.  An ambiguity 
of International Shoe is resolved by later cases including Shaffer v. Heitner, 
which also sets up a striking contrast with Burnham itself.  
In International Shoe, a company incorporated in Delaware with its 
principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri was conducting its 
shoe-selling business in the state of Washington though somewhat 
indirectly.  The company had no offices or inventory in Washington, 
except a single sample shoe of each model.52  However, the company 
employed sales persons who lived in Washington to solicit prospective 
customers in the state.53  All orders were sent by the customers to the 
St. Louis office, and the offers were accepted or rejected there, rather 
than in Washington.54  However, sales to Washington customers were 
substantial, with commissions to the salespersons being over $31,000 
per year (equivalent today to about $420,000 with adjustments for 
inflation).55  The state of Washington sought to compel the company to 
contribute to the state’s unemployment compensation fund, and the 
crucial issue was whether the Washington state courts could 
constitutionally render an in personam judgment against the company.56 
An individual, having a literally corporeal body, is either present or 
not in a forum state at the time of service.  By contrast, corporations 
and other artificial business entities obviously cannot be analyzed so 
literally and simplistically.57  Instead the Court recognized that 
                                               
 51. See, e.g., id. at 414–16; Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause 
and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts from Pennoyer to Denckla:  A Review, 25 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 569, 573 (1958). 
 52. Perhaps this is why the company called itself International Shoe, in the 
singular, rather than International Shoes. 
 53. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313–14 (1945). 
 54. Id. at 314. 
 55. See CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., 
https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
 56. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 311. 
 57. Ten years before International Shoe, the great legal philosopher Felix Cohen 
had mockingly skewered Benjamin Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals for 
grappling literalistically with the question, “Where is a corporation?,” and failing to 
acknowledge that the question is metaphorical.  See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense 
and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 809–12 (1935).  Cohen equated this 
exercise with asking, “How many angels can stand on the point of a needle?,” and used it 
as a prime example of what he called “transcendental nonsense.”  Id. at 810–11. Cohen has 
more to teach us as well, see infra note 210 and accompanying text. 
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corporate “presence” is a matter of degree, and that whether a court 
declares a corporation to be present within the state depends on 
whether the corporation’s contacts with the state are sufficiently 
substantial to satisfy due process.58  In a single powerful paragraph, the 
Court explicitly rejected Pennoyer’s physical presence requirement and 
announced the new standard: 
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam 
is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant’s person.  
Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was 
prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him.  
But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal 
service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only 
that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he 
be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain 
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does 
not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”59 
                                               
  In fact the case that Cohen discusses has a strong family resemblance with 
International Shoe itself, involving a Pennsylvania corporation that was held amenable to suit 
in a New York court by virtue of its New York activities.  Id. at 809–10 (discussing Tauza v. 
Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (1917)).  In that case, Judge Cardozo wrote, 
[w]e are to say . . . whether [the corporation’s] business is such that it is here.  If 
in fact it is here, if it is here, not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure 
of permanence and continuity, then, whether its business is interstate or local, 
it is within the jurisdiction of our courts . . . .  Unless a foreign corporation is 
engaged in business within the state, it is not brought within the state by the 
presence of its agents.  But there is no precise test of the nature or extent of the 
business that must be done.  All that is requisite is that enough be done to enable 
us to say that the corporation is here. . . .  If it is here it may be served. 
Tauza, 115 N.E. at 917–18 (citations omitted). 
 58. The Court wrote: 
Since the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction intended to be 
acted upon as though it were a fact, it is clear that unlike an individual its 
“presence” without, as well as within, the state of its origin can be manifested 
only by activities carried on in its behalf by those who are authorized to act for 
it.  To say that the corporation is so far “present” there as to satisfy due process 
requirements, for purposes of taxation or the maintenance of suits against it 
in the courts of the state, is to beg the question to be decided.  For the terms 
“present” or “presence” are used merely to symbolize those activities of the 
corporation’s agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to 
satisfy the demands of due process. 
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–17 (citations omitted).  Clearly someone on the Court had 
been reading his Felix Cohen. 
 59. Id. at 316 (citations omitted).  The capias ad respondendum was an old common 
law writ under which the sheriff would physically bring the defendant to the forum to 
answer the complaint.  As explained in an older version of Black’s Law Dictionary, 
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Corporations and their fictional presence aside, this passage clearly 
validates in personam jurisdiction over a defendant not served within the 
forum, at least under certain circumstances.  And its key passage 
describing those circumstances, namely the having of certain “minimum 
contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,”60 has remained at 
the core of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence to the present day.61 
Note that this minimum contacts language constitutes a “standard” 
as opposed to a “rule.” That is, the minimum contacts standard is 
flexible, or malleable, in that it relies heavily on the nuances of 
particular facts of a case, and on a given judge’s assessment of how 
those facts stack up against the standard.62  In the bulk of its opinion 
following the announcement of the minimum contacts standard, the 
International Shoe Court imposes a certain amount of structure on 
which facts must be considered and how these facts must be assessed, 
but this structure does very little to reduce the standard’s flexibility.  
The structure amounts only to two dimensions along which the facts 
                                               
capias was a judicial order “by which actions at law were frequently commenced; and 
which commands the sheriff to take the defendant, and him safely keep, so that he may 
have his body before the court on a certain day, to answer the plaintiff in the action.  It 
notifies defendant to defend suit and procures his arrest until security for plaintiff’s 
claim is furnished.”  Capias Ad Respondendum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (rev. 4th ed. 
1968); see also Capias Ad Respondendum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(current and more concise definition).  For the way in which the capias writ fits with 
this Article’s main arguments, see infra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 60. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
 61. Moreover, one way of rephrasing this Article’s central thesis, appearing in Part 
II, is that this minimum contacts passage also reflects what courts were groping for 
before it appeared in International Shoe. 
 62. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).  Kennedy explains that standards are flexible, indeterminate, 
and administrable only in light of detailed factual contexts.  Id. at 1685, 1688.  
Accordingly, standards require a judge to exercise discretion in their application.  
International Shoe’s minimum contacts standard is a classic example, and other 
examples would include a prohibition on driving faster than is safe under the 
circumstances, or the “best interests of the child” rule in a child custody dispute.  By 
contrast, rules are relatively rigid and determinate, and thus are readily administrable 
by reference to a limited number of facts, leaving little room for the exercise of discretion 
by judges or other law administrators.  Id. at 1685.  Examples include the sufficiency of 
service-while-present rule (i.e., the core of Scalia’s opinion in Burnham), a requirement 
to stop at a red traffic light, or a statute of limitations requiring commencement of a tort 
lawsuit within one year of the commission of the tort.  For a detailed consideration of the 
standard versus rule dichotomy in another context, see Andrea Coles-Bjerre, Trusting the 
Process and Mistrusting the Results:  A Structural Perspective on Article 9’s Low-Price Foreclosure 
Rule, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 351, 376–80 (2001). 
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might be arrayed, namely the level of the contacts and the relatedness 
of those contacts to the cause of action.63  A moment’s consideration 
makes clear that both of these dimensions are inherently matters of 
degree, not matters of kind.  Indeed, the Court itself proceeds to stress 
the malleable nature of the new test: 
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line 
between those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation 
to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or 
quantitative.  The test is not merely, as has sometimes been 
suggested, whether the activity, which the corporation has seen fit to 
procure through its agents in another state, is a little more or a little 
less.  Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the 
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly 
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due 
process clause to insure.64 
All of this is in the starkest contrast to Pennoyer’s presence criterion.  
The presence criterion is a classic rule rather than a standard because 
it poses a black-and-white dichotomy that any given judge is likely to 
                                               
 63. According to the Court: 
“Presence” in the state in this sense has never been doubted when the activities 
of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also 
give rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no consent to be sued or 
authorization to an agent to accept service of process has been given.  Conversely 
it has been generally recognized that the casual presence of the corporate agent 
or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a state in the 
corporation’s behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action 
unconnected with the activities there . . . .  While it has been held, in cases on 
which appellant relies, that continuous activity of some sorts within a state is not 
enough to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits 
unrelated to that activity, there have been instances in which the continuous 
corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a 
nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely 
distinct from those activities . . . .  Finally, although the commission of some 
single or occasional acts of the corporate agent in a state sufficient to impose an 
obligation or liability on the corporation has not been thought to confer upon 
the state authority to enforce it, other such acts, because of their nature and 
quality and the circumstances of their commission, may be deemed sufficient to 
render the corporation liable to suit. 
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317–18 (citations omitted). 
 64. Id. at 319 (citations omitted).  The Court’s reference to “the purpose” of the 
due process clause as being ultimately determinative of whether the minimum contacts 
standard is satisfied is typical of legal standards generally.  See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 
62, at 1688 (“The application of a standard requires the judge both to discover the 
facts of a particular situation and to assess them in terms of the purposes or social 
values embodied in the standard.”). 
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resolve with the same hard-and-fast results as any other judge.65  The 
Pennoyer question can be answered mechanically, easily, and 
predictably.  The International Shoe question requires a judge to do the 
hard work of, well, judging, and it demands that the legal system be 
willing to entrust the judge with the wise exercise of her discretion. 
Lucid though it was, International Shoe left unanswered for the time 
being two questions that are central to this Article.  First, is the 
reasonableness standard different from the power standard, or just a 
reformulation of it?66  And second, assuming that the two standards are 
different, what is the relationship between them:  are both necessary, 
or is either one on its own sufficient? Answers to both questions 
emerged in later cases (notably Shaffer, discussed shortly), but first it 
will be useful to further explore the questions themselves. 
Today, International Shoe is accepted as standing for the proposition 
that personal jurisdiction has two separate requirements:  the court’s 
power must be measured not only by the older power test (“de facto 
power,” as the court refers to Pennoyer in International Shoe’s key 
passage),67 but also by a second requirement, newly announced, namely 
that it be reasonable for the state to exercise that power 
(“reasonableness,” for short).68  But, as Professor Clermont points out, 
International Shoe can also be read in an alternative way, under which the 
reasonableness standard more or less ousts the power test.  Under this 
interpretation, reasonableness “reduc[es] the power test to the status of 
a rough rule of thumb.”69  Two of International Shoe’s fairly early progeny 
followed this interpretation,70 and indeed the famous key passage of 
International Shoe itself, quoted above, supports such a reading.71 
                                               
 65. In the simplicity of their criteria, rules tend to resemble metonymies.  See infra 
notes 133–136 and accompanying text. 
 66. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (explaining that “[h]istorically the jurisdiction of 
courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de factor power over the 
defendant’s person,” but not stating whether the new reasonableness standard is a 
departure from or an extension of the prior approach). 
 67. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 68. In support of the separateness of the two requirements, see the discussion of 
Shaffer, infra notes 74–82 and accompanying text; see also Clermont, supra note 47, at 
415–23 (distinguishing the power and reasonableness tests based on Kulko v. Superior 
Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), and World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), in addition to Shaffer). 
 69. Clermont, supra note 47, at 416. 
 70. See id. at 417–18 (discussing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 
(1950), and McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), in terms of the reasonableness test). 
 71. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  “Historically” a court’s in personam 
jurisdiction was grounded on de facto power; hence the defendant’s physical presence 
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Turning now to the relationship between the power test and the 
reasonableness standard, International Shoe itself already made clear 
that the reasonableness standard was sufficient for the court to exercise 
power.  For example, the Court writes that the “demands” of due 
process “may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state 
of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system 
of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit 
which is brought there.”72  Thus, if the defendant has minimum 
contacts with the state that made it reasonable to maintain the suit 
there, then the court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant, 
without regard to his or her or its actual presence—and similarly 
without regard to domicile or consent.73  But, saying that satisfying the 
reasonableness test is sufficient does not necessarily answer whether 
satisfying the reasonableness test is necessary even when the power test 
is also met.  To set up a very pointed hypothetical example, suppose that 
the defendant satisfies the power test because she was physically present 
in the state when served with the summons, but that her contacts with 
the state are otherwise so slight as to keep it from being reasonable for 
the law to force her to defend a suit there.  On facts like this, the suit 
may go forward only if we conclude that the reasonableness test is not 
necessary but only sufficient.  Burnham eventually in fact so holds, but 
only in a surprising retrenchment from Shaffer v. Heitner. 
Shaffer centers on the wing of Pennoyer’s power test that this Article 
has left aside until now, namely in rem and quasi in rem actions, in 
which the court’s power is asserted over particular property of the 
                                               
in the jurisdiction “was prerequisite” to the rendering of an in personam judgment; 
“[b]ut now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons 
or other form of notice, due process requires only” that there be minimum contacts such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.  Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added). 
  The opinion’s other references to reasonableness, quoted in infra note 72 
immediately below and the accompanying text, are consistent with this reading.  
Separate references to a continuing power test are not found here.  They are found 
elsewhere in the opinion when the court refers, always with scare-quotes, to the 
corporation’s “‘presence’” in the state. 
 72. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.  Similarly, after evaluating the shoe company’s contacts 
with Washington, the Court concluded that the company’s operations “establish 
sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just, 
according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice, to permit the 
state to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred there.”  Id. at 320. 
 73. Id. at 316–17 (“For the terms ‘present’ or ‘presence’ are used merely to 
symbolize those activities of the corporation’s agent within the state . . . .”). 
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defendant, rather than over the defendant him or herself.74  Heitner 
was a shareholder of Greyhound Corporation using the procedural 
device of a derivative suit to vindicate alleged mismanagement of the 
corporation by its officers and directors.75  The suit was filed in 
Delaware Chancery Court, though the assertedly wrongful activities in 
question had taken place in Oregon and the defendants in question 
were not Delaware residents.76  Jurisdiction over twenty-one of the 
defendants was asserted on a quasi in rem basis, pursuant to two 
Delaware statutes and the fact that the defendants owned Greyhound 
shares.77  The first statute, called a sequestration statute, provided that 
the court could compel a defendant to appear in the lawsuit by seizing 
any of the defendant’s property located in Delaware, holding it for sale 
if the plaintiff wins a judgment or if the defendant fails to appear or 
otherwise defaults.78  The second statute, which we might call a situs 
statute, provided that all stock of corporations organized in Delaware—
as Greyhound was—was deemed to be located in Delaware.79  The state 
                                               
 74. Unlike in personam judgments, in rem judgments and quasi in rem judgments 
are limited to rights to particular property.  In rem judgments affect the rights of all 
persons to the property, good examples being eminent domain proceedings, actions 
to quiet title, and partition actions.  By contrast, quasi in rem judgments affect only 
the rights of particular persons to the property.  See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 209 (1st ed. 2005); 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE CIVIL § 1070 (4th ed. 2013).  For example, in the type of quasi 
in rem action involved in Shaffer—sometimes called “attachment jurisdiction”—the 
plaintiff has a claim against the defendant that is unrelated to the property; seeks to 
apply the property to the satisfaction of the claim; and uses the presence of the 
property in the forum as the basis for bringing the defendant into court.  433 U.S. 186, 
208–09 (1977).  Pennoyer was not a valid in rem case, because the land was seized by 
the sheriff at the end of the legal proceedings as part of the execution of the judgment, 
and was not attached by the court at the beginning of the legal proceedings.  95 U.S. 
714,  720 (1877), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 168 (1977). 
 75. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 189–90. 
 76. Id. at 189–91. 
 77. Id. at 190–92. 
 78. DEL CODE ANN., tit. 10, § 366 (1975); see also Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 190–91 n.4.  The 
statute required the property owner to make a general appearance in the case in order to 
petition the court for a release of the property.  Hence the statute appeared, unusually for 
a quasi in rem statute, to make no provision for a limited appearance, by which a defendant 
can defend his interest in the property without exposing himself to in personam liability. 
 79. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 169 (1975); see also Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 192 (“The stock 
was considered to be in Delaware, and so subject to seizure, by virtue of [Delaware 
law], which makes Delaware the situs of ownership of all stock in Delaware 
corporations.”).  In reality, the paper certificates representing the defendants’ 
Greyhound stock might have been physically located anywhere, most likely at their 
residences which as noted were outside of Delaware.  In more modern times, 
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courts below were perfectly happy with this resulting syllogism:  
defendants had stock within the forum; therefore, the forum had power 
over the property; and, therefore, the forum had quasi in rem 
jurisdiction over the defendants.80 
The Shaffer Court rejected this syllogism and declared that 
International Shoe’s reasonableness standard applies just as squarely to 
actions in rem or quasi in rem as it does to actions in personam.81  
Adopting a Realist, substance-over-form style of exposition reminiscent 
of International Shoe itself, the Court declared that: 
“[T]raditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” can be as 
readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no 
longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures that are 
inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage.  The 
fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but 
an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports an 
ancient form without substantial modern justification.  Its continued 
acceptance would serve only to allow state-court jurisdiction that is 
fundamentally unfair to the defendant.  We therefore conclude that 
all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according 
to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.82 
In other words, if the court is affecting the defendant’s property, then the 
court is affecting the defendant him or herself, and before the court can 
affect the defendant, it must satisfy the standards of International Shoe. 
To conclude this prologue to Burnham, then, the effects on Pennoyer of 
the International Shoe-type cases are twofold.  First, International Shoe itself 
loosens Pennoyer’s physical presence criterion so that it includes other 
contacts with the jurisdiction.  And second, and more important to this 
                                               
certificates representing the stock might not exist at all.  The certificate’s deemed 
location is thus transparently fictional, and Felix Cohen might have had fun with it.  
See supra note 57; see also Wendy Collins Perdue, The Story of Shaffer:  Allocating 
Jurisdictional Authority Among the States, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 129, 137 & n.6 
(Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008) (noting the Cohen connection).  The Supreme 
Court did not dwell on this fact, though one can speculate that the weakness of a 
power-based argument based on the stock’s location might have helped the justices in 
ruling against Heitner on the reasonableness-based grounds. 
 80. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 229 (Del. 1976), rev’d sub nom., 
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (“[J]urisdiction under § 366 remains, as it was 
in 1963, quasi in rem founded on the presence of capital stock here, not on prior 
contact by defendants with this forum.”). 
 81. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212. 
 82. Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).  Justice Marshall wrote for the 
majority, and Justices Powell, Stevens and Brennan concurred with all or most of the 
majority’s key conclusion extending International Shoe. 
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Article, Shaffer shows that International Shoe restricts the exercise of Pennoyer’s 
power test so that the court’s exercise of the power must be reasonable. 
C.   Burnham and the Grotesquerie of Tag Jurisdiction 
The judicial grotesquerie of Burnham v. Superior Court arises from the 
factually sad but straightforward story of Dennis Burnham and his wife 
Francie.83  They were happily—and subsequently unhappily—married 
in New Jersey, where they had begun to raise their two children.84  The 
couple eventually decided to separate, and Francie moved with the 
children across the country to the San Francisco Bay Area.85  Dennis 
remained in New Jersey, but when a business trip took him to Southern 
California he went up to the Bay Area to visit the children.86  He took the 
older child into San Francisco, and when he brought the child back 
home, he was greeted by Francie and a summons for a divorce proceeding 
she had commenced in California.87  Dennis objected to a California 
court having personal jurisdiction over him, a New Jersey resident.88 
Schematically, these facts—just like those of Shaffer—pose the 
question of whether the minimum contacts test represented by 
International Shoe is not only sufficient to support personal jurisdiction 
over a non-resident, but also necessary.89  If Dennis’s relationship with 
California was insufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts standard—
an interesting and potentially difficult question, in light of the 
standard’s fact-intensive nature90—then his physical presence in the 
forum state at the time he was served with the summons is the only basis 
                                               
 83. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 607 (1990) (plurality opinion). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 607–08. 
 86. Id. at 608. 
 87. Id.  If all that were at issue between Dennis and Francie had been the marriage 
and divorce, then the only territorial authority that the court would have needed 
would have been in rem jurisdiction over this status.  See supra note 26.  But Francie 
was also seeking monetary relief against Dennis, thereby presenting the issue of the 
court’s personal jurisdiction. 
 88. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 608. 
 89. Id. at 610 (“The question we must decide today is whether due process requires 
a similar connection between the litigation and the defendant’s contacts with the State 
in cases where the defendant is physically present in the State at the time process is served 
upon him.”). 
 90. Justice Brennan’s concurrence holds that Dennis’s relationship with California 
did in fact satisfy the minimum contacts standard.  Id. at 637–38 (Brennan, J., 
concurring).  This, of course, is the reason that the opinion is a concurrence rather than 
a dissent.  Scalia’s opinion does not reach the question, presumably because it would be 
dictum in light of the plurality’s overall reasoning.  Id. at 619–20 (plurality opinion). 
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on which to uphold personal jurisdiction over him.91  This is 
constitutional only if International Shoe’s modern test is simply a matter 
of sufficiency, but not of necessity.92 
Justice Scalia wrote the plurality opinion for the splintered bench.93  
This opinion upholds tag jurisdiction even in the absence of minimum 
contacts.94  Dennis was subject to personal jurisdiction of the California 
court based on his physical presence at the time of service alone, even 
though his presence was merely transitory.95  (The three days that Dennis 
spent in California might just as well have been fifteen minutes, in Scalia’s 
view.)96  Stated differently, the opinion holds that International Shoe’s 
modern test is only a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction—not a 
necessary one.97  Presence in the forum state while being served with 
process is held here to remain an independently sufficient basis even after 
International Shoe.  The structural inconsistency with Shaffer is clear:  Shaffer 
had imposed a two-criteria structure on personal jurisdiction, at least in 
the in rem and quasi in rem cases, and Burnham reverts to a one-criterion 
structure. There is also a doctrinal tension with Shaffer, which had stated 
that “all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according 
to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.”98  Justice 
Scalia’s ruling does not comport with this statement.99 
                                               
 91. See id. at 619 (plurality opinion) (“The short of the matter is that jurisdiction 
based on physical presence alone constitutes due process . . . .”). 
 92. See id. (explaining that nothing in International Shoe or its progeny suggests that 
physical presence within a forum state “is itself no longer sufficient to establish jurisdiction”). 
 93. Scalia was joined for all or most of this opinion by three other Justices:  
Rehnquist, Kennedy, and White, with only Justice White departing from this group for 
its relatively non-central Parts II.D and III.  See id. at 607; see also infra note 99.  The 
opinion of a competing group of four, with Justice Brennan writing for himself as well 
as Justices Marshall, Blackmun and O’Connor.  See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 628 (Brennan, 
J., concurring); see also infra note 104.  Justice Stevens wrote alone.  See Burnham, 495 
U.S. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).  Overall, Burnham is characterized 
by two competing four-Justice opinions. 
 94. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619 (plurality opinion). 
 95. Id. at 623–25. 
 96. Id. at 625 (objecting to Brennan’s concurrence by supposing that Dennis 
enjoyed “not three days’ worth of California’s ‘benefits,’ but 15 minutes’ worth”); see also 
id. at 610–11 (describing a view that states have power over a present defendant “no 
matter how fleeting his visit”). 
 97. See id. at 619 (“Nothing in International Shoe or the cases that have followed it . . . 
offers support for the . . . proposition . . . that a defendant’s presence in the forum is not 
only unnecessary . . . but is itself no longer sufficient to establish jurisdiction.”). 
 98. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1972) (emphasis added). 
 99. Justice Scalia anticipates this objection and has a response that is perhaps too 
cute for his own good, because it turns out to support this Article’s thesis.  In Part II.D of 
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Justice Scalia relies on the long history of the service-while-present 
rule.100  The relevant part of his opinion opens by declaring that power 
over a physically present defendant is “[a]mong the most firmly 
                                               
the opinion, he asserts that the passage from Shaffer just quoted above must be read in 
the two-sentence “context” of its immediately preceding reference to in rem 
proceedings.  See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 620–21; supra note 74 and accompanying text 
(discussing the context to which Scalia appeals).  This “context,” plus the “meaning” of 
the statement, the “logic” of Shaffer, and what that opinion “was saying, in other words,” 
all assertedly prevent Shaffer from being read so broadly as to conflict with Scalia’s 
opinion in Burnham.  Perhaps so—but if recourse to “context” is to be welcomed, along 
with recourse to the asserted “meaning” and the asserted “logic” of opinions, and if we 
are invited to express judicial opinions “in other words,” then the field for interpretation 
is vastly opened beyond what Scalia’s style of jurisprudence generally sanctioned. 
  Moreover, there is an important reminder about the common-law method to 
be had from the fact that the Shaffer majority was writing the “all assertions” passage of 
that opinion by reference only to the in rem and quasi in rem question before it, and 
not anticipating the later circumstances of Burnham’s tag jurisdiction question.  The 
reminder is simply that opinions are written under the circumstances then existing, 
with the thoughts and concerns then present to a judge’s mind.  The same applies with 
full strength to judges of an earlier historical era and thus, the early judges who 
embraced the service-while-present rule, with no exception for transient presence, had 
no reason to make such an exception because the circumstances under which the 
exception would apply were not important to them.  See infra Part II.B.3. 
  Justice White did not join Burnham’s Shaffer-limiting Part II.D, nor did he join 
Part III, which rejects the assertion in Brennan’s opinion that due process would require 
a full factual analysis of the case’s minimum contacts.  Among those who do use Burnham 
to limit Shaffer, Justices Scalia and Kennedy had not yet been appointed to the Court at 
the time of Shaffer and, as noted above, Justice Rehnquist took no part in Shaffer. 
  In considering whether the Scalia opinion does in fact comport with Shaffer, it 
is also very valuable to consider a passage from International Shoe itself.  After setting 
forth the matrix of contacts and relatedness, the Court explains that: 
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those 
activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which 
do not, cannot simply be mechanical or quantitative. . . .  Whether due process 
is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in 
relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the 
purpose of the due process clause to insure.  That clause does not contemplate 
that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or 
corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations. 
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (citations omitted).  Thus, 
Scalia’s reliance on the tradition growing from Pennoyer is in substantial tension with 
what the International Shoe Court viewed that tradition as being.  “[O]ne would have 
thought that tag jurisdiction could not survive after International Shoe replaced 
territorial hegemony with a personal jurisdiction inquiry based on reasonable and fair 
connection between the defendants, the forum, and the action.”  Jeffrey W. Stempel, 
The Irrepressible Myth of Burnham and Its Increasing Indefensibility After Goodyear and 
Daimler, 15 NEV. L.J. 1203, 1255 (2015). 
 100. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 610. 
2018] A LINGUISTIC CRITIQUE OF TAG JURISDICTION 25 
 
established principles of personal jurisdiction in American tradition.”101  
The opinion continues: 
The view developed early that each State had the power to hale before 
its courts any individual who could be found within its borders, and 
that once having acquired jurisdiction over such a person by properly 
serving him with process, the State could retain jurisdiction to enter 
judgment against him, no matter how fleeting his visit.102 
Indeed, Scalia’s argument rests chiefly on his assertion that a rule 
supporting tag jurisdiction is long standing, including that it was the 
understanding of American courts at the time of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s adoption.103  To this extent, the opinion is an originalist 
                                               
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 610–11 (emphasis added).  No great imagination is needed to extend the 
Burnham rule to cases in which a defendant is served at a rest stop while cutting 
through a corner of the state on a highway, or on an airplane while in the airspace of 
the forum state below.  “Ladies and gentlemen, if you’ll look out the windows to your 
left, you’ll see that we’re now passing over the Grand Canyon and entering the great 
state of Arizona, the courts of which you may now be subject to the jurisdiction of.  
Welcome to the West.”  See, e.g., Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Ark. 
1959) (holding that service made on a defendant while flying in the airspace above the 
forum state was sufficient to create personal jurisdiction because the defendant was 
“within the ‘territorial limits’ of the State of Arkansas” at the time of service); see also 
Stempel, supra note 99, at 1225 (calling Grace “probably the most outlandish example of 
the exercise of tag service being used to establish personal jurisdiction notwithstanding 
the new jurisdictional paradigm of fairness and reasonable expectation”). 
  Clearly the Scalia opinion is consonant with what Ehrenzweig, Clermont, and 
others have called the power theory of personal jurisdiction.  See supra notes 21–22 and 
accompanying text.  In the oral arguments for a recent case involving the 
constitutionality of an Arizona statute empowering its state officials to take actions under 
federal immigration laws, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), Justice Scalia 
posed a question with overtones of Burnham’s power theory:  “[I]f, in fact, somebody who 
does not belong in this country is in Arizona, Arizona has . . . no power? . . .  [W]hat does 
sovereignty mean if it does not include the ability to defend your borders?”  Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 34, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182). 
 103. As part of his historical argument, Scalia ably argues from the negative: 
Most States, moreover, had statutes or common-law rules that exempted from 
service of process individuals who were brought into the forum by force or 
fraud, or who were there as a party or witness in unrelated judicial 
proceedings.  These exceptions obviously rested upon the premise that service 
of process conferred jurisdiction. 
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 613 (citations omitted).  On the force or fraud exception, see 
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 82(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1971).  
However, the existence of all of these exceptions also supports this Article’s anti-
Burnham thesis.  Similarly, the four-justice concurrence authored by Brennan 
characterizes Scalia’s opinion as relying “solely on historical pedigree.”  See Burnham, 
495 U.S. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
26 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1 
 
one—a mode of judicial reasoning on which cognitive linguistic 
analysis can sometimes shed new perspective as shown below.104 
Justice Scalia himself nonetheless acknowledges certain authorities that 
tend to undermine his historical assertion of the long-standing roots of 
tag jurisdiction.105  This assertion was also a matter of contention in the 
Burnham opinion itself, including exegesis of quite a volume of old case 
law,106 and the subject has continued to be examined since then.107  It is 
not this Article’s task to settle that matter, but the historical uncertainty is 
itself instructive for purposes that we will revisit below.108 
Burnham’s other substantial opinion, written by Justice Brennan, also 
upholds the tag jurisdiction rule, so that the issues raised by Scalia’s 
                                               
 104. See infra note 265 and accompanying text.  Closing the loop on this aspect of the 
Scalia opinion’s reasoning, the assertedly long-standing nature of the service-while-present 
rule makes the related Due Process Clause threshold easier to meet.  “The distinction 
between what is needed to support novel procedures and what is needed to sustain 
traditional ones is fundamental . . . .  The short of the matter is that jurisdiction based on 
physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing 
traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard of ‘traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice.’”  Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619.  The contrast that Scalia 
draws here with Shaffer’s relatively newfangled and unique sequestration procedure is 
implicit here and made explicit later.  See id. at 619–23, 622 n.4. 
  Justice Brennan responds that International Shoe’s reference to “traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice” meant simply “that those concepts are 
indeed traditional ones,” and did not mean that “their specific content was to be 
determined by tradition alone.”  Id. at 629 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring).  That the 
syntactic parsing of International Shoe’s crucial phrase is so open to dispute should cause 
us all to moderate our confidence in being able to know the thinking process that 
underlies judges’ opinions, particularly judges of the distant past.  See infra Section III.A. 
 105. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 611 (plurality opinion) (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A 
General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241, 253–60 (1965), and 
Ehrenzweig, supra note 21) (noting that English law antecedents to tag jurisdiction are 
not as clear as Justice Story thought). 
 106. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 611–16, 613 n.2, 614 n.3 (listing case precedent in 
support of Scalia’s reasoning); id. at 633–35, 633–36 n.8–10 (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(listing opposing case law to refute Scalia’s majority opinion).  Not cited by the Court 
is a scholarly response to Ehrenzweig by Nathan Levy, Jr., which doubted that there is 
enough evidence to make an absolute statement on the historical facts of a tag 
jurisdiction rule.  See Nathan Levy, Jr., Mesne Process in Personal Actions at Common Law 
and the Power Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 52, 94 (1968). 
 107. See James Weinstein, The Early American Origins of Territoriality in Judicial 
Jurisdiction, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 4 (1992) (taking issue with Scalia’s assertion that 
transient jurisdiction was prevalent earlier in the nineteenth century). 
 108. See infra Section III.A (recognizing a puzzle about whether the contacts-as-
presence metonymy was ever “live” as opposed to purely subconscious). 
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opinion are all the more important.109  The Brennan opinion, however, 
crucially recognizes that International Shoe and Shaffer must control the 
inquiry,110 and by the same token, crucially recognizes that there are 
certain “outer limits” to the constitutionality of tag jurisdiction, based 
for example on involuntary or unknowing presence.111  (The Scalia 
opinion mentions the possibility of such outer limits but only to wrest 
them into service as support for the historical argument that tag 
jurisdiction itself is of long standing.)112  These outer limits are really 
the issue, from a judicial process point of view.113  The main question 
posed by the Scalia/Brennan divide is whether the legal system should 
allow today’s judges to judge the tradition against a new standard; or 
instead, neuter today’s judges by holding them to judgments made 
many decades ago—subconsciously and primitively, as the body of this 
Article will argue.114  And maybe Burnham itself is closer to the outer 
limits than Brennan thinks!  Three days is not very long and part of 
those three days were for a business trip and therefore unrelated to the 
children, let alone to the divorce proceeding for which he was 
tagged.115  Moreover, that business trip was at the other end of 
California, a geographically large state.116  And finally, for Dennis to 
want to see his kids is not a lightly held human need—does due process 
really allow adverse parties to capitalize on this?117  
                                               
 109. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 628–29 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“I agree with Justice 
Scalia that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment generally permits a 
state court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant if he is served with process while 
voluntarily present in the forum State.”). 
 110. Id. at 628–33. 
 111. Id. at 637 n.11.  Suppose, for example, that Francie Burnham tagged Dennis with 
her summons while he was in California solely for the purpose of defending himself in 
an unrelated lawsuit.  Or suppose that she tagged him while he was hiking in in the Lake 
Tahoe area of Nevada but had inadvertently strayed over the California state line.  Scalia’s 
opinion in the case refers briefly to “force or fraud” and presence in the jurisdiction “as 
a party or witness in unrelated judicial proceedings.”  See supra note 103. 
 112. See supra note 103.  “These exceptions obviously rested upon the premise that 
service of process [would otherwise have] conferred jurisdiction.”  Burnham, 495 U.S. 
at 613 (plurality opinion). 
 113. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 613 (casually dismissing scenarios in which tag 
jurisdiction may unfairly burden defendants). 
 114. See generally infra Part II. 
 115. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 608. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Cf. Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(recognizing that even promises extracted by duress may not be involuntary, “unless 
‘involuntary’ is a conclusion rather than the description of a mental state”).  “If the 
threat is ferocious (‘your money or your life’) and believed, the victim may be 
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Many criticisms of the Burnham case have been voiced by others,118 
and it is not this Article’s job to rehearse them.  Instead, Part II of the 
Article will develop a new ground of critique. 
D.   Physical Presence or Minimum Contacts:  Which One Really Came First? 
It is crucial to note that the Scalia opinion takes for granted a certain 
relationship between the traditional approach and the modern approach, 
namely that physical presence is primary and that minimum contacts is 
secondary—not just temporally but also conceptually.  Of course the 
minimum contacts standard was announced later in time than the 
physical presence test, but Scalia writes that the minimum contacts 
standard “was developed by analogy to ‘physical presence,’” and that 
accordingly “it would be perverse” to say that the minimum contacts 
standard could now be “turned against” physical presence’s “touchstone 
of jurisdiction.”119  According to the Scalia opinion, physical presence is 
primary, or original, while minimum contacts is secondary, or derivative. 
                                               
desperately eager to fend it off with a promise.”  Id.  To flatly take “voluntary” presence 
in a jurisdiction, for even the most compelling circumstances, and proceed to equate 
that presence with “voluntary” subjection to wholly unrelated lawsuits in the forum, 
defies common sense and arguably the Due Process clause. 
 118. See, e.g., Peter Hay, Transient Jurisdiction, Especially over International Defendants:  
Critical Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 593, 
593 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Tradition, Fairness, and Personal Jurisdiction:  Due Process and 
Constitutional Theory After Burnham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 675, 678–81 
(1991); Stanley E. Cox, Would That Burnham Had Not Come to Be Done Insane!  A Critique 
of Recent Supreme Court Personal Jurisdiction Reasoning, an Explanation of Why Transient 
Presence Jurisdiction is Unconstitutional, and Some Thoughts About Divorce Jurisdiction in a 
Minimum Contacts World, 58 TENN. L. REV. 497, 502–03, 542 (1991) (arguing that Scalia’s 
opinion “seems to yearn for the good old days of territoriality”); Allen R. Kamp, The 
Counter-Revolutionary Nature of Justice Scalia’s “Traditionalism,” 27 PAC. L.J. 99, 111 (1995) 
(comparing Scalia’s traditionalist opinion to the Anglican Church, which rejects evolving 
traditional models for ideal models of the past).  Clermont writes that tag jurisdiction: 
has also long been the recipient of criticism from academics and foreigners 
alike.  Formerly the most important basis of U.S. jurisdiction, it is today far 
from essential.  It is occasionally used to sue foreigners in the United States, 
even though the resulting judgment would be unlikely to receive recognition 
or enforcement abroad.  Indeed, courts use transient jurisdiction, albeit 
inappropriately, only when all appropriate bases of jurisdiction are unavailing. 
Kevin M. Clermont, A Global Law of Jurisdiction and Judgments:  Views from the United States 
and Japan, 37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 17 (2004) (footnotes omitted). 
 119. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619; see also id. at 618 (“As International Shoe suggests, the 
defendant’s litigation-related ‘minimum contacts’ may take the place of physical presence 
as the basis for jurisdiction . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at 620 (referring to “the 
‘minimum contact’ that is a substitute for physical presence” (emphasis added)).  
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Part II of this Article suggests flipping the above relationship.  
Perhaps the relationship presumed by the Scalia opinion has actually 
always been the other way around.  In other words, perhaps minimum 
contacts rather than physical presence has always been the primary 
concept—even pre-International Shoe and even pre-Pennoyer.  And by the 
same token, perhaps physical presence has never been more than a 
secondary approximation of minimum contacts, again even pre-
International Shoe and even pre-Pennoyer.  Or alternatively, perhaps we 
can even view physical presence and minimum contacts as two facets 
of the same concept.  If either of these is the case, then the reasoning 
of the Scalia opinion collapses.  And metonymy theory, set forth in Part 
II, shows how compelling the case can be. 
II.    CRITIQUING SCALIA’S BURNHAM OPINION  
WITH METONYMY THEORY 
At one level or another, all judicial decision making is purposive, 
and in the modern era that purposiveness has tended to come to the 
foreground of judges’ expressed reasoning.120  International Shoe is a 
clear example:  the opinion forthrightly changes the law for the 
express purpose of accommodating inherited doctrine to new social 
realities.121  By contrast, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Burnham expressly 
appeals not to purpose but solely to the authority of the past, namely 
physical presence having for so long been a “touchstone” of personal 
jurisdiction.122  Completely absent from the opinion is any attention to 
why the basic service-while-present rule developed in the first place, 
and of whether those reasons truly supported the related rule of tag 
jurisdiction (assuming that tag jurisdiction ever was truly a rule)123—let 
 
 
                                               
The assertedly longstanding nature of the physical presence rule is crucial to Justice 
Scalia’s reasoning, because an ancient rule will more easily pass Due Process muster than 
a new one.  See supra note 104. 
 120. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (recognizing that 
legal decisions need to reflect changing social norms). 
 121. Id.  
 122. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619.  Even this opinion is purposive, of course, though at 
a more subterranean and unarticulated level, presumably having much to do with the 
valuing of authority for its own sake and the constraining of judicial discretion.  See 
generally infra Section III.B. 
 123. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
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let alone the vital question of whether those reasons continue to be 
convincing in the twentieth and now twenty-first centuries.124  Purposive 
                                               
 124. Justice Scalia’s Burnham opinion is thus a departure not just from International 
Shoe but also from the main stream of recent personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.  
Notably, first, in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the Court restricted a 
forum state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over corporations organized in other 
states to forums in which the corporation is “fairly regarded as at home,” that is, forums 
roughly equivalent to an individual’s domicile.  564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011).  The Court 
invoked a classic law journal article naming domicile, place of incorporation, and 
principal place of business as “the paradigm bases for the exercise of general 
jurisdiction.”  Id. (citing Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 
TEX. L. REV. 723, 782 (1988)).  Later, in Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Court held the 
Goodyear paradigms to be exhaustive and rejected the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
even in another forum where the defendant “engages in a substantial, continuous, and 
systematic course of business.”  571 U.S. 117, 138 (2014); see also Stempel, supra note 
99, at 1250 (noting that general jurisdiction resembles tag jurisdiction insofar as the 
cause of action need not have any substantive relationship to the defendant’s contacts 
with the forum and arguing that the retrenchment shown by Goodyear and Daimler 
supports a corresponding restriction on tag jurisdiction). 
  The incongruity between Goodyear and Daimler on one hand, and Burnham on 
the other, has been expressly noted.  In her concurring opinion to Daimler, Justice 
Sotomayor notes the “incongruous result” that an individual can be tagged with 
process based on a one-time visit to the forum, while “a large corporation that owns 
property, employs workers, and does billions of dollars’ worth of business in the State 
will not be, simply because the corporation has similar contacts elsewhere (though the 
visiting individual surely does as well).”  571 U.S. at 158 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in 
judgment); see also Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear 
Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527, 548 (2012) (pointing out the “bizarre fact” that after 
Goodyear, it is “much easier to establish general jurisdiction over individuals than over 
corporations” because of Burnham). 
  For a recent case closely analogous to Burnham and rejecting the exercise of 
general jurisdiction, see King v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 632 F.3d 570, 580 (9th Cir. 
2011), finding that “beginning the process of applying to do business and appointing 
an agent for service of process” is merely dipping one’s toe into the state and 
insufficient on due process grounds for exercising personal jurisdiction.  For further 
consideration of the susceptibility of corporations or other entity defendants to tag 
jurisdiction, see Cody J. Jacobs, If Corporations Are People, Why Can’t They Play Tag?, 46 
N.M. L. REV. 1, 2 (2016), advocating for the availability of tag jurisdiction over 
corporations and other entities through in-state service on their officers; Tanya J. 
Monestier, You’re It!  Tag Jurisdiction over Corporations in Canada, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 583, 583–84 (2017), critiquing a recent Supreme Court of Canada opinion that, in 
the author’s view, essentially endorses tag jurisdiction over corporations. 
  Regarding specific jurisdiction as well as general jurisdiction, the Supreme 
Court has been narrowing the range of fora in which a corporation is subject to 
personal jurisdiction.  See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 
1781 (2017) (denying specific jurisdiction over drug manufacturer where many but 
not all of the drug user/plaintiffs lived in the forum state); Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 
1115, 1126 (2014) (finding that in suit by Nevada resident over Drug Enforcement 
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judges, lawyers, and scholars demand reasons for rules being the way they 
are; the only good rule is a rule supported by good reasons.125 
Part II of this Article suggests a highly plausible linguistic and 
cognitive reason that early judges might have adopted the service-
while-present rule, and this reason leads to a rich critique of Scalia’s 
Burnham opinion. The argument is that judges in earlier centuries 
would have subconsciously taken presence within the jurisdiction as a 
convenient approximation or reference point—a metonymy—for the 
defendant having a reasonable level of contacts with the jurisdiction. 
After all, in the pre-modern era, with cross-border transportation and 
communication being so laborious, a person could not, as a practical 
matter, have much, if any, contacts with a jurisdiction without being 
present there, and the need for tag jurisdiction would rarely, if ever, arise.  
So, the argument goes, it is not that presence, for these early judges, had 
some kind of inherent significance of its own; rather, presence was 
associated with contacts.  We can say, in other words, that the thinking 
behind International Shoe actually predated the thinking behind Pennoyer!  
Minimum contacts, not presence, has always been the “touchstone”126 of 
personal jurisdiction.  It just wasn’t always articulated this way because the 
PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS metonymy was subconscious. 
From this insight, it becomes easy to demolish Scalia’s Burnham 
opinion.  The twentieth century’s easy and rapid modern 
transportation made it possible for persons to be physically located in 
a jurisdiction without having a level of contacts that makes it 
reasonable for them to be haled into that jurisdiction’s courts.  To 
uphold tag jurisdiction under these circumstances is, in Shaffer’s words, 
to support “an ancient form without substantial modern 
justification.”127  Presence in the jurisdiction is only a formal 
approximation, dating from an earlier era, and contacts with the 
jurisdiction is the substance for which those early judges were 
                                               
Administration deputy for allegedly tortious conduct at Georgia airport, Nevada court 
lacked specific jurisdiction because the asserted Nevada injury did not meaningfully 
connect the defendant to the forum); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 
886 (2011) (holding, in a personal injury suit against a non-U.S. manufacturer of a 
shearing machine, that the court did not have specific jurisdiction over the defendant 
because its conduct had not been purposefully directed toward the forum state). 
 125. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 628 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (explaining that rules that are “arbitrary and lacking in common sense” 
should not stand). 
 126. Id. at 619 (plurality opinion). 
 127. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977); see also supra note 82 and 
accompanying text. 
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reaching.  Scalia should have followed that earlier substance rather 
than supporting the ancient form. 
In sum, Scalia treats service-while-present in the jurisdiction as being 
conceptually and historically primary, with minimum contacts being a 
mere later approximation of presence.  This Article suggests, by 
contrast, that minimum contacts is conceptually and historically 
primary, with presence in the jurisdiction having been an early 
distortion of minimum contacts.  The distortion was first introduced by 
judges of an earlier era, but they, of course, are blameless because the 
society in which they lived and reasoned had no reason to distinguish 
between presence and effects.  That this distortion was accepted and 
perpetuated by the Scalia opinion, though, is thoroughly blameworthy. 
A.   Metonymy and Metaphor, Live and Dead 
Metonymy is a linguistic and conceptual device in which a person 
refers to one thing for the conscious or subconscious purpose of 
denoting another thing.  To elaborate on this Article’s initial example, 
a newscaster might say, “The White House today nominated fourteen 
individuals to fill vacancies on the federal bench.”  Of course, the 
newscaster does not mean that a white building from the Federal-style 
of architecture somehow uttered the words of nomination; instead, he 
or she is referring to the building as a way of referring to the persons 
and powers of the executive branch of the U.S. government. 
But simply describing metonymy as a reference to one thing in order 
to denote another does not adequately distinguish metonymy from 
metaphor; and, in fact, metonymy is perhaps most easily described by 
contrast to metaphor.  Both devices are tools for abstract reasoning, 
often at the subconscious level.  Metaphor draws upon a relationship 
of similarity between things in two different domains—that is, two 
different areas of human experience. For example, when a professor 
inquires whether her students are “grasping the concept” under 
discussion, she of course is not asking whether the students are literally 
holding the concept firmly in their hands; instead, she is making use 
of the similarities between manual holding and mental understanding.  
Of course, on one level, the domain of holding is very different from 
the domain of understanding:  the first is physical, observable, and 
relates to objects, while the second is mental, invisible, and relates to 
thoughts.  Nonetheless, there is a network of similarities between the 
two domains—for example, if we grasp something, then we can look at 
it closely or from different angles, and we can pass it along to another 
person.  Indeed, a moment’s reflection makes clear that people very 
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often conceive of thinking or understanding (the second domain) in 
terms of holding or manipulating objects (the first domain).128  In sum, 
metaphor connects two different domains and thereby posits certain 
similarities between them.  In common speech, understanding is 
posited to be similar to grasping; to Shakespeare’s Romeo, Juliet is 
similar to the sun;129 and to Katy Perry, having a unique and vital 
personality is similar to giving off light that sparkles in darkness.130 
In contrast to metaphor with its two different domains, metonymy 
involves only one domain, and the two elements of the single 
metonymic domain are connected by a relationship not of similarity 
but of contiguity—that is, physical or conceptual connectedness, or 
closeness, or strong association.131  In the newscaster example above, 
                                               
 128. A few examples from ordinary speech help to establish the prevalent nature of 
the conceptual linkage: 
[I]deas are objects that you can play with, toss around, or turn over in your mind.  
To understand an idea is to grasp it, to get it, to have it firmly in mind. 
Communication is exchanging ideas.  Thus, you can give someone ideas and get 
ideas across to people.  Teaching is putting ideas into the minds of students, 
cramming their heads full of ideas.  To fail to understand is to fail to grasp, as 
when an idea goes over your head or right past you.  Problems with understanding 
may arise when an idea is slippery, when someone throws too many things at you 
at once, or when someone throws you a curve. 
GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH:  THE EMBODIED MIND AND 
ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 240 (1999) [hereinafter LAKOFF & JOHNSON, 
PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH]. 
  Theorists today generally view metaphors as being conceptual rather than 
purely linguistic, so that spoken or written phrases like “grasping the concept” are 
“metaphorical expressions” as distinct from the underlying, more general conceptual 
relationship of MANUAL HOLDING FOR MENTAL UNDERSTANDING.  Retracing this thesis is 
beyond the scope of this Article but is well explored in PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH and 
elsewhere.  See, e.g., id. at 240–41; GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS 
THINGS:  WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND xi (1987) [hereinafter LAKOFF, 
WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS].  In law, see STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN 
THE FOREST:  LAW, LIFE, AND MIND xi (2001).  On thinking as object manipulation in 
particular, see Bjerre, supra note 24, at 112–14. 
 129. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2, line 3 (J.A. Bryant, Jr. ed., 1986) 
(“But, soft! what light through yonder window breaks?  It is the east, and Juliet is the sun.”). 
 130. Katy Perry, Firework, on TEENAGE DREAM (Capitol Records 2010) (“Baby, you’re 
a firework[.]”). 
 131. “Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, 
provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same 
idealized cognitive model.”  Radden & Kövecses, supra note 4, at 21 (emphasis added).  
“In the example of She’s a pretty face, the ‘pretty face’ serves as the vehicle for accessing 
the ‘person’ as the target; in the reverse description, She’s a pretty person, the ‘person’ 
serves as the vehicle for accessing the person’s ‘pretty face’ as the target.”  Id. at 19.  See 
generally DIRK GEERAERTS, DIACHRONIC PROTOTYPE SEMANTICS:  A CONTRIBUTION TO 
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there is no particular similarity between the white Federal-style 
building (the vehicle) and the powers of the executive branch (the 
target), but they are connected to each other because the former is the 
symbol of the latter, and the former is the primary location from which 
the public perceives the latter as being exercised.  To take another 
common example, if one server at a diner tells another that “[t]he ham 
sandwich is waiting for his check,”132 of course the clear meaning of the 
                                               
HISTORICAL LEXICOLOGY 97 (1997) (describing how “entities . . . related by contiguity 
can be said to have something to do with each other in an objective sense:  they interact 
or co-occur in reality, and not just in the mind of the beholder”). 
  The concept of idealized cognitive model, or ICM, is beyond the scope of this 
Article, but one can gloss it as referring to abstractions based on domains or realms of 
experience.  Cf. Radden & Kövecses, supra note 4, at 21 (describing metonymic processes 
as linking different “ontological realms”).  The idea of sameness or singleness of a domain 
is what is important here.  The term “contiguity” literally denotes physical connectedness, 
but in modern discussions of metonymy the term is used more loosely (metaphorically, in 
fact) to mean relatedness.  See, e.g., JOHN R. TAYLOR, LINGUISTIC CATEGORIZATION:  
PROTOTYPES IN LINGUISTIC THEORY 123–24 (2d ed. 1995) (“[C]onnections between entities 
which co-occur within a given conceptual structure . . . .  The entities need not be 
contiguous, in any spatial sense.”). 
  In 1956, the great Russian structuralist, Roman Jakobson, provided an incisive 
contrast of metaphor and metonymy in the context of aphasia patients.  See Roman 
Jakobson, Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances, in 
FUNDAMENTALS OF LANGUAGE 57, 58–82 (1956).  Jakobson identifies two poles of 
aphasia, the “contiguity disorder” and the “similarity disorder,” as constituting a 
spectrum along which patients can be classified.  Id. at 63, 71.  Patients near the former 
pole are unable to linguistically express contiguity and must instead resort to metaphor 
(i.e. to expressions of similarity), while patients near the latter pole are unable to 
linguistically express similarity and must instead resort to metonymy (i.e. to 
expressions of contiguity).  Id. at 76.  For patients near the pole of similarity disorder, 
“contiguity determines the patients’ whole verbal behavior . . . .”  Id. at 70.  As Jakobson 
suggests by referring to poles rather than clear-cut categories, the distinctions between 
metaphor and metonymy are not always clear-cut.  See, e.g., KATHRYN ALLAN, METAPHOR 
AND METONYMY:  A DIACHRONIC APPROACH 182 (2008) (noting that metaphor and 
metonymy should be viewed on a continuum with “uncontroversial cases” at either end 
and “‘messier,’ less prototypical cases which involve a greater degree of subjective 
judgment somewhere between the two”); Nick Riemer, When is a Metonymy No Longer a 
Metonymy?, in METAPHOR AND METONYMY IN COMPARISON AND CONTRAST 379, 383–88 
(René Dirven & Ralf Pörings eds., 2003) (discussing ambiguities and indeterminacy in 
the line between metaphor and metonymy, for example, with regard to an expression 
like “the landlady kicked him out of the house”). 
 132. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 35 (1980) 
[hereinafter LAKOFF & JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY].  Remarks by coffee shop 
servers about menu items seem to have fascinated metonymy theorists for some reason.  
See, e.g., id. at 38 (“The BLT is a lousy tipper.”); LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS 
THINGS, supra note 128, at 77 (“The ham sandwich just spilled beer all over himself.”); 
RAY JACKENDOFF, THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE LANGUAGE FACULTY 54 (1997) (“The ham 
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sentence is that the customer who ordered the ham sandwich—rather than 
the construct of white bread, yellow mustard, and lunch meat—is 
waiting for the check.133  The real meaning (i.e. the customer as target) 
and the surface expression (i.e. the sandwich as vehicle) are related, 
though, at least by the fact that the former ordered the latter.   
Metonymy often takes a relatively complex intended referent, such 
as an intricate concept or social phenomenon (think a defendant’s 
contacts with a forum state), and substitutes for it a simpler surface 
referent such as a physical object or physical relationship (think a 
defendant’s presence in the forum state).134  Examples from everyday 
life might include saying, “My cousin is a brain,” instead of describing 
the cousin’s intelligence, introverted personality, or the like; or, saying, 
“Senator So-and-So is an empty suit,” instead of describing the 
senator’s ineffectuality, insincerity, or tendency to rely on style rather 
than substance.  Alternatively, metonymy may take a phrase that is 
relatively cumbersome to articulate (for example because it demands 
more words, or contextually superfluous words), and substitutes for it 
                                               
sandwich in the corner wants some more coffee.”); TAYLOR, supra note 131, at 123 
(“The pork chop left without paying.” (emphasis omitted)); Geoffrey Nunberg, The 
Non-Uniqueness of Semantic Solutions:  Polysemy, 3 LINGUISTICS AND PHIL. 143, 149 (1979) 
[hereinafter Nunberg, Non-Uniqueness of Semantic Solutions] (“The ham sandwich is 
sitting at table 20.”); Geoffrey Nunberg, Transfers of Meaning, 12 J. OF SEMANTICS 109, 
115 (1995) [hereinafter Nunberg, Transfers of Meaning] (“Who is the ham sandwich?” 
and “The ham sandwich is at table 7.”); David Stallard, Two Kinds of Metonymy, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 31ST ANNUAL MEETING ON THE ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTATIONAL 
LINGUISTICS 87 (1993) (“The hamburger is waiting for his check.”). 
  The contrast between ham sandwiches on one hand, and a defendant’s 
susceptibility to personal jurisdiction on the other, highlights the enormous practical 
importance that the linguistic theory of metonymy (not to mention metaphor and 
other linguistic devices) can carry, when brought out of the relatively controlled 
precincts of linguistics and into the unruly realities of law. 
 133. Apart from common sense, grammar helps to prove that the customer, rather 
than the sandwich, is the real referent of the sentence in the text above.  Otherwise 
the possessive pronoun “his” would not be used.  See Nunberg, Transfers of Meaning, 
supra note 132, at 115 (pointing out that, “That french fries is getting impatient” is a 
normal English sentence, but “Those french fries are getting impatient” is not). 
 134. The idea of “substitution” in this context is, today, considered to be only a 
simplified or approximate way of describing the operation of metonymy.  The current 
more precise thinking is that a metonymy’s source or vehicle “activates” the 
conceptually more complex target in the hearer or reader’s mind.  See generally Antonio 
Barcelona, The Cognitive Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy, in METAPHOR AND METONYMY 
AT THE CROSSROADS:  A COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE 1 (Barcelona ed., 2003). 
36 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1 
 
a phrase that is more economical to articulate.135  In “The ham 
sandwich is waiting for his check,” superfluous words are saved, 
because of course the source of the impatience to which the first server 
is alerting the second server is a person, and when that fact is so 
obvious, there is no need for the busy servers to make explicit reference 
to that person himself rather than his relevant distinguishing factor.136  
In either case—complexity of the referent or complexity of the proper 
locution of the referent—the process of mental simplification is surely 
one of the reasons why ordinary human minds have tended to make 
metonymy such a prevalent device.  It helps people’s thought and 
language processes to function, so, of course, people often use it.137  
Some metaphors are said to be “dead” rather than “live,” and the 
concept can apply to metonymy too.  The proper dividing line between 
                                               
 135. Lakoff generalizes, in the slightly different context of models of categories, 
that a vehicle will be chosen when compared to the target; the vehicle is “either easier 
to understand, easier to remember, easier to recognize, or more immediately useful 
for the given purpose in the given context.”  LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS 
THINGS, supra note 128, at 84. 
 136. Informal evidence (the author’s father owned a coffee shop) suggests that ham 
sandwiches are a relatively distinctive item to order from the menu. 
  A similar example would be a departing restaurant patron handing her car key 
to a parking lot attendant and saying, “I’m parked out back,” saving the unnecessary 
reference to the car itself, which goes without saying in the context of this interaction.  
See Nunberg, Transfers of Meaning, supra note 132, at 110 (giving a similar example 
without reference to the expression being economical).  Nunberg’s article shows that 
metonymy and metaphor are both devices that enable transfers of meaning, that is, 
“us[ing] the same expression to refer to what are intuitively distinct sorts of categories of 
things.”  Id. at 109. 
 137. Professor Langacker describes metonymy in terms of a “reference-point 
construction”: 
[T]he entity that is normally designated by a metonymic expression serves as 
a reference point affording mental access to the desired target (i.e., the entity 
actually being referred to) . . . .  Metonymy . . . occurs in the first place because 
it serves a useful cognitive and communicative function.  What is this function?  
Metonymy allows an efficient reconciliation of two conflicting factors:  the 
need to be accurate, i.e., of being sure that the addressee’s attention is 
directed to the intended target; and our natural inclination to think and talk 
explicitly about those entities that have the greatest cognitive salience for 
us . . . .  [A] well-chosen metonymic expression lets us mention one entity that 
is salient and easily coded, and thereby evoke—essentially automatically—a 
target that is either of lesser interest or harder to name. 
Ronald W. Langacker, Reference-Point Constructions, 4 COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 1, 30 
(1993) [hereinafter Langacker, Reference-Point Constructions]; see also RONALD W. 
LANGACKER, GRAMMAR AND CONCEPTUALIZATION 199 (1999) (chapter 6 being an 
adaptation of the 1993 article). 
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dead and live metaphors is unsettled; however, the standard view is that 
a dead metaphor is one that has become “conventional.”  This means 
that the metaphor has been adopted as a standard part of linguistic 
expression, so that speakers and hearers treat it literally, without the 
metaphor reflecting an imaginative act of cognition.138  For example, 
the expression, “We’re at a crossroads in our relationship,” is 
metaphorical, comparing the domains of having a romantic 
relationship and traveling along a path—but this expression can more 
specifically be said to be a dead metaphor, because it has become a 
conventional part of the modern English language such that 
“crossroads” can now literally mean not just an intersection, but also 
any important decision-point.139 
                                               
 138. E.g., H.W. FOWLER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 348–49 (1937) 
(distinguishing between live metaphors, which “are offered and accepted with a 
consciousness of their nature as substitutes for their literal equivalents” and dead 
metaphors, which “have been so often used that speaker & hearer have ceased to be 
aware that the words are not literal”); cf. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK TURNER, MORE THAN 
COOL REASON:  A FIELD GUIDE TO POETIC METAPHOR 55 (1989); CORNELIA MÜLLER, 
METAPHORS DEAD AND ALIVE, SLEEPING AND WAKING:  A DYNAMIC VIEW 221 (2008) 
(“[D]ead metaphors may be activated in speaking and writing and become very much 
alive indeed.  Regarded as elements of a linguistic system they may be dead, 
entrenched, or novel; as elements used in speech, they oscillate between sleeping and 
waking, depending on the degrees of activated metaphoricity in given contexts of 
use.”).  The Pat Benatar song title, Love is a Battlefield, on LIVE FROM EARTH (Chrysalis 
1983), is one good example of a live metaphor.  See also Zadie Smith, On the Road:  
American Writers and Their Hair, spoken word performance at Neal Pollack’s & Timothy 
McSweeney’s Festival of Literature, Theater, and Music (July 26, 2001), transcript 
available at http://eyeshot.net/zadiesmith.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (“Kansas 
City is oven hot, dead metaphor or no dead metaphor.”). 
  The fact that the dividing line between dead and live metaphors is unsettled 
might reflect the fact that the label “dead metaphor” is itself metaphorical, because it 
draws together the domains of life or death on one hand and cognitive activity on the 
other.  See Bjerre, supra note 24, at 127 n.83.  In fact, among linguists, the expression 
“dead metaphor” is probably not only metaphorical but also a dead metaphor. 
 139. See Crossroad, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 59 (2nd ed. 1989) (defining 
“crossroad” as both “[t]he place where two roads cross each other” and “[a] point at 
which two or more courses of action diverge; a critical turning point”). 
Lakoff, Johnson, and most other cognitivists contend that the category of dead 
metaphors is actually much smaller than just described.  In their view, a metaphor 
must be judged as live or dead at the level of its underlying concepts, not at the level 
of the particular expressions that instantiate the metaphor.  See LAKOFF & TURNER, 
supra note 138, at 97.  The particular expression, “We’re at a crossroads in our 
relationship” is just one instantiation of the conceptual metaphor love is a journey, 
which continues to be alive and productive of new expressions that have not been 
conventionalized.  E.g., LAKOFF & JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 128, 
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A metonymy, similarly, might be said to “die” when it becomes 
conventionalized.140  Nick Riemer discusses the example of “breast 
beating,”141 which is well understood as referring to an ostentatious 
expression of sadness or guilt—for example, a politician’s flowery 
lamenting of a problem, unconnected with constructive efforts to solve 
it.  Riemer argues that “breast beating” is not metaphorical, even 
though the domain of physically striking one’s own body is different 
from the domain of expressing emotion; instead “breast beating” is a 
metonymy that has become conventionalized and is accordingly 
dubbed by Riemer a post-metonymy.142  Similarly the political terms 
“left” and “right” are relatively dead metonymies, having originally 
referred literally to legislative seating arrangements during the French 
Revolution.143  If the expression “nice wheels” as a way of expressing 
admiration for means of transportation survives into future years in 
which people use jet-packs and no longer remember cars, the 
expression will have become a dead metonymy.  Nonetheless “the 
relevance of metonymy or metaphor as the explanatory principle 
behind an extension does not disappear when an extended meaning 
becomes conventionalized or generalized.”144 
Regardless of whether they are live or dead, metaphors and 
metonymies are overwhelmingly subconscious, both in how speakers or 
writers produce them and in how hearers or readers understand them.145  
                                               
at 122–27; LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 138, at 55.  On dead metaphors generally, see 
MÜLLER, supra note 138, at 221. 
 140. There is a parallel in metonymy theory to the thinking discussed in supra note 
139 about the continuing vitality of seemingly dead metaphors.  “A linguistic 
expression may eventually cease to be used metaphorically or metonymically but the 
corresponding conceptual projection may still be alive and be reflected in other 
linguistic expressions.  And the more entrenched conceptual metaphors or 
metonymies, those with a more direct bodily basis seldom, if ever, die.”  Barcelona, 
supra note 134, at 5 (citing LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 138, at 49–67). 
 141. Riemer, supra note 131, at 392–94. 
 142. Id.  The expression “breast beating” is “a metonymy that is no longer manifest 
in most of the occurrences of the figure, where no breast beating will occur.”  Id. at 
393.  With expressions like this, “their contexts of use have ‘overshot’ the domains of 
their original appropriateness . . . .”  Id. at 394. 
 143. E.g., Jesse Norman, Where Did the Right and the Left Come From?, THE SPECTATOR 
(Feb. 15, 2014, 9:00 AM), https://www.spectator.co.uk/2014/02/the-great-debate-by-
yuval-levin-review. 
 144. NICK RIEMER, THE SEMANTICS OF POLYSEMY:  READING MEANING IN ENGLISH AND 
WARLPIRI 203 (2005). 
 145. On the initially surprising notion of a metaphor being subconscious but still 
live, see LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 138, at 129 (noting that it is a mistake to discount 
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With metaphor, in 99 out of 100 cases, when one friend confides to 
another that he or she is “in a relationship that is going nowhere,” the 
speaker is not consciously choosing to highlight similarities between the 
domains of having a relationship and of going down a path, nor is the 
hearer noticing and then decoding the fact that one domain is being 
described in terms of another.  Similarly, with metonymy, when one busy 
diner server warns another that “the ham sandwich is waiting for his 
check,” the speaker is acting subconsciously, and for convenience as 
noted above, when he or she omits the direct reference to the customer.  
(It is absurdly entertaining to imagine this metonymy being conscious.  
“Hmm, all of the checks that I and my co-worker write are for human 
beings, and when I warn my co-worker about one of those human beings 
becoming impatient, both I and my co-worker really just want the check 
to be written and delivered, so that the most salient aspect in this context 
is the dish for which the customer is being charged. I might as well do us 
both a favor by cutting directly to that chase rather than making a needless 
reference to the human being.”).146 
                                               
the cognitive importance of dead metaphors, and explaining that those things in our 
cognition that are most alive and active are not necessarily those that are conscious; 
instead, those that are most alive are so automatic as to be unconscious). 
 146. Sometimes metaphor and metonymy are deployed rhetorically, as the result of 
conscious choice on the part of the speaker.  See, e.g., JONATHAN CHARTERIS-BLACK, 
POLITICIANS AND RHETORIC:  THE PERSUASIVE POWER OF METAPHOR 2 (2005) (discussing 
the use of metaphor in political messages); GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN 
ELEPHANT!:  KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE 56 (2004) (examining the 
strategic use of metaphorical framing in political discourse); KATHLEEN AHRENS, 
POLITICS, GENDER AND CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS 1 (Kathleen Ahrens ed., 2009) 
(discussing the use of metaphorical framing as applied to gender-related issues); 
Radden & Kövecses, supra note 4, at 52–53 (exploring the use of metonymy for specific 
rhetorical purposes); Judith A. Harris, Recognizing Legal Tropes:  Metonymy as 
Manipulative Mode, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1215, 1223 (1985) (discussing the Jakobson model 
and exploring manipulability of choice of law doctrine); Linda L. Berger, Of Metaphor, 
Metonymy, and Corporate Money:  Rhetorical Choices in Supreme Court Decisions on Campaign 
Finance Regulation, 58 MERCER L. REV. 949, 955–57 (2007) (analyzing the framework 
from Lakoff and Johnson); Ian Bartrum, The Constitutional Canon as Argumentative 
Metonymy, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 327, 329 (2009) (exploring the way canonical 
texts can be invoked as arguments for larger associated ideas).  Marketing experts still 
commonly use metonymy with brand names, such as Impala for a car, presumably 
intending to efficiently capture otherwise nebulous qualities like swiftness, grace, and 
strength.  See STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF THOUGHT:  LANGUAGE AS A WINDOW INTO 
HUMAN NATURE 303 (2007) (stating that companies choose brand names to “connot[e] 
a quality they wished to ascribe”).  Even in these conscious deployments of metaphor 
and metonymy, economy and convenience of the hearer or reader’s thought is still a 
primary motivator, and so too, often, is the hearer or reader’s subconscious. 
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Indeed, the subconscious nature of metaphor and metonymy is a large 
part of what makes them so useful.  Our conscious minds are crowded and 
busy, like the calendar of a C.E.O., and for the mind to relegate certain 
forms of thought to the subconscious is somewhat like the C.E.O. 
delegating certain tasks to her legions of staff members.  It frees the valuable 
conscious attention for other things.  By the same token, it creates risks of 
things going wrong, as explored with presence in Section II.B. 
B.   Presence as a Metonymy for Minimum Contacts 
This Section II.B. presents the heart of this Article’s argument, 
namely that the longstanding criterion of service-while-present in the 
jurisdiction is perhaps best understood as never having been more 
than a metonymy for what is now familiar to us as the minimum 
contacts standard.  The service-while-present rule predates Pennoyer, 
but the Scalia opinion in Burnham bizarrely perpetuated it as being 
sufficient to support tag jurisdiction, even in the absence of the 
minimum contacts that International Shoe found to be at the heart of 
due process. My argument is that the pre-Pennoyer judges who 
developed the service-while-present rule did so because, in their era 
predating modern communication, a defendant’s contacts with a 
jurisdiction were always accompanied by the defendant’s presence in 
the jurisdiction—hence, there was no practical need to distinguish 
contacts from presence, and the judges articulated the rule in terms of 
presence rather than contacts in accordance with the ordinary 
principles of metonymy. 
Overall, the central issue that this Section II.B. addresses is the 
question of why the pre-Pennoyer judges chose to express the rule in 
terms of presence, rather than in terms of contacts, if indeed what they 
really meant is the contacts rather than the presence.  In linguistic terms, 
the question is why the judges employed any metonymy at all, and in 
particular why they employed presence as the metonymy’s vehicle.147 
The answers are rich, taking several forms.  They are set out below, 
some of them echoing and some of them deepening the basic 
understanding of metonymy already presented in Section II.A.  When 
all of the following are taken together, it becomes apparent that the 
metonymy of PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS is strongly motivated—that is, a 
number of selection principles converge in establishing the 
                                               
 147. See supra note 131 for a discussion of vehicle and target as the constituent 
elements of metonymy.  Generally, the vehicle, which is articulated, provides cognitive 
access to the target, which is not articulated. 
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naturalness and expectability of the judges having articulated the rule 
as they did.148  The judges selected a highly natural vehicle with which 
to access their target. 
1.  Simplification by reference to a contiguous and closely associated feature 
As seen in Section II.A, simplification by reference to a contiguous 
feature is one of the basic reasons why a speaker or writer (in this case, 
the judges of the early service-while-present era) would use a 
metonymy at all.  Presence in a jurisdiction is of course a simpler 
concept than “minimum contacts with that jurisdiction such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice,”149 or any similar notion.150  Presence is a simple 
black-or-white criterion that can be determined with little or no effort 
on a judge’s part—a boilerplate affidavit by the process server will 
suffice.  By contrast, the minimum contacts standard is highly nuanced 
and fact sensitive; there will often be cases close to the line with which 
the judge’s mind and conscience must wrestle.151 
Presence in the jurisdiction is contiguous with contacts therewith, 
because presence and contacts are both aspects of the same domain of 
life experience.  That is, both are elementary and utterly familiar facets 
of the fact that a person (the defendant) exists:  he or she goes to places 
and occupies their space; he or she does things while in that space, and 
those actions have effects.  Moreover, physical presence is closely 
associated with effects.  During the historical era in which the service-
while-present rule was promulgated, it was unusual for a person to have 
                                               
 148. Thus, PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS is a better motivated metonymy than some 
others, in which some selection principles are at odds with others.  E.g., Radden & 
Kövecses, supra note 4, at 51 (discussing an example, “The buses are on strike,” which fits 
with principles such as interactional over non-interactional but does not fit with other 
principles such as human over non-human). 
 149. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 150. The quotation marks in this sentence risk conveying the unintended 
impression that the target of a metonymy must itself be linguistic.  See infra notes 153–
157 and accompanying text. 
 151. See, e.g., Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 622 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating 
“[t]hough neither side decisively triumphs under this analysis, it appears that there was 
enough . . . to compel a finding of jurisdiction”); Synopsys, Inc. v. Ubiquiti Networks, 
Inc., No. 17-cv-00561, 2017 WL 3485881, at *26 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2017) (denying a 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction when the requisite knowledge was not 
proven but certain “allegations make it sufficiently plausible to infer knowledge”); 
Hosain v. Malik, 671 A.2d 988, 1009–11 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (discussing the 
competing interests to protect a child from hardship and discourage circumvention of 
foreign law in declining to exercise personal jurisdiction in a custody dispute). 
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effects in a place without being physically present there.  Before the 
modern advent of easy transportation and communication, contacts 
with a forum were impossible without physical presence.  
At first glance, there is a notable difference between the judicial 
thinking process that this Article posits and the examples of metonymy 
described above; namely, that in the examples above, a careful and self-
conscious speaker or writer would have been able to avoid the 
metonymy if he or she wished.  (The coffee shop server could have 
referred explicitly to the customer who ordered the ham sandwich; the 
newscaster could have referred to the particular Executive Branch 
official who nominated the prospective judges, or to the constitutional 
basis from which the official derives his or her power).  In other words, 
at first glance, metonymy is a purely linguistic phenomenon, limited to 
the simple substitution of one articulation for another, with the 
unused articulation nonetheless being relatively easily available to the 
speaker, albeit disfavored as discussed above.  And by contrast, the 
PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS metonymy as used by the pre-Pennoyer judges 
involves the use of one articulation for an as-yet unformulated 
concept—indeed a rather abstruse concept which would not be 
articulated by anyone until the era of International Shoe.152  So the 
PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS metonymy does not involve a simple 
substitution of one articulation for another and hence it is different 
from the other metonymies discussed heretofore in a way that must be 
explained if the hypothesis is to be sustained. 
The explanation lies in the idea, well recognized in cognitive 
linguistics, that metonymy is not solely linguistic—metonymy is also 
and perhaps primarily cognitive.  That is, metonymy operates at the 
level of thinking and understanding, not just at the level of speaking.  
Professors Radden and Kövecses explicitly reject the idea that 
“metonymy operates on names of things” or “involves the substitution 
of the name of one thing for that of another thing,”153 and instead 
argue that metonymy is cognitive in that it leads to the formation of 
“new, complex meaning.”154  Similarly, Professor Barcelona points out 
that metonymy is frequently involved in a number of “generally 
‘invisible’ conceptual operations or conceptual structures (i.e. 
operations/structures not directly coded by a particular linguistic form) that 
                                               
 152. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
 153. Radden & Kövecses, supra note 4, at 17. 
 154. Id. at 19. 
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underlie online linguistic processing,”155 and that this is evidence “both 
of the conceptual nature of metonymy and of the fact that metonymy is 
not confined to lexical meaning.”156 
Once one realizes that metonymy is cognitive and not simply 
linguistic,157 its use by the pre-Pennoyer judges in initially and clumsily 
formulating ideas such as contacts with the jurisdiction is perfectly 
natural, and PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS ceases to look like a troubling or 
aberrant case.  Instead, the fact that the targets in examples like the ham 
sandwich and the White House could have been so easily paraphrased 
by those speakers is an accidental attribute.  The most noteworthy aspect 
of all of these metonymies is simply their subconscious nature.  The 
vehicle is always articulated, but the target is not necessarily something 
that could have been articulated instead. 
2. Patterns of salience 
Professor Langacker points out that metonymy is a device that lets 
us mention a vehicle that is “salient and easily coded” in order to evoke 
a less salient or harder to name target.158  Salient means prominent or 
conspicuous,159 and Langacker and others have identified a number of 
principles that help to make a given vehicle salient to ordinary human 
beings based on their ordinary life experience.160 
One prime principle is that humans are more salient than non-humans.  
(Following this principle, the defendant him or herself would be more 
salient than his or her effects.)  Langacker remarks that “[p]eople make 
                                               
 155. Antonio Barcelona, Metonymy is Not Just a Lexical Phenomenon:  On the Operation of 
Metonymy in Grammar and Discourse, in SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE 2008 STOCKHOLM 
METAPHOR FESTIVAL 13, 17 (Nils-Lennart Johannesson & David C. Minugh, eds., 2009) 
(emphasis added). 
 156. Id. (emphasis added). 
 157. Indeed, thinking of metonymy in purely linguistic terms is metonymic.  The 
relatively easy to access and articulate vehicle of language is substituted for the more 
amorphous and difficult to articulate target of cognition. 
 158. Langacker, Reference-Point Constructions, supra note 137, at 30. 
 159. See Salient, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 392 (2nd ed. 1989) (“Of immaterial 
things, qualities, etc.:  Standing out from the rest; prominent, conspicuous”).  The 
word is etymologically and metaphorically related to “jumping out.”  Id. at 392. 
 160. At the risk of stating the obvious, the category of ordinary human beings 
includes judges.  See Andrea Coles-Bjerre, Bankruptcy Theory and the Acceptance of 
Ambiguity, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327, 376 (2006) (“In this modern era we have come far 
enough to know that law is not an artificial mode of reasoning, to recognize that judges 
are no more or less human than the rest of us, and even to accept that judicial minds 
work in much the same way as ordinary people’s minds.”). 
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especially good reference points,”161 and Radden and Kövecses write that 
“[o]ur basic human experiences are derived from our anthropocentric 
view of the world and our interaction in the world,” in which “humans 
take precedence over non-humans.”162  As applied to metonymy this is 
evidenced, for example, by the frequency with which we refer to “a 
Picasso” rather than the more accurate “a painting by Picasso” or even 
more difficult related concepts.163  Langacker further observes that “a 
person is often selected [as a vehicle] even when absent, non-visible, or 
no longer in existence (as an integral whole).”164  My argument is that in 
formulating the service-while-present rule in terms of PRESENCE FOR 
CONTACTS, the early judges articulated the rule in terms of the presence 
of the defendant herself, rather than in terms of the effects of the 
defendant who in many cases may be present but in other cases may not be 
present.  Langacker helps us to see that the defendant herself remains a 
good vehicle for the metonymy even in cases where she is not present.165 
Another important principle is that a whole is more salient than a 
part.  (Accordingly, the defendant as a whole is more salient than 
particular facets of his contacts with the forum.)166  Langacker links 
                                               
 161. Langacker, Reference-Point Constructions, supra note 137, at 30. 
 162. Radden & Kövecses, supra note 4, at 45. 
 163. “When we think of a Picasso, we are not just thinking of a work of art alone, in 
and of itself.  We think of it in terms of its relation to the artist, that is, his conception 
of art, his technique, his role in art history, etc.  We act with reverence toward a Picasso, 
even a sketch he made as a teen-ager, because of its relation to the artist.”  LAKOFF & 
JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 128, at 39. 
 164. Langacker, Reference-Point Constructions, supra note 137, at 30.  His examples 
include, “She bought Lakoff and Johnson, used and in paper, for just $1.50” and one 
involving gravediggers comparing two skulls and saying “Yorick is slightly larger than 
Polonius.”  Id. at 29 (emphasis omitted). 
 165. If humans are more salient than non-humans, one may wonder why our friends 
the coffee-shop servers refer to their customer, who is surely human, as a ham sandwich, 
which is not.  The answer is “the skewing of salience relationships that specific 
circumstances often induce.”  Id. at 30.  Using the example of one nurse telling another, 
“The (vasectomy/herniated disc) in 304 needs a sleeping pill,” Langacker explains that: 
nurses may well know virtually nothing about their individual patients except 
the nature of their malady or medical procedure; this is what they are primarily 
responsible for dealing with.  Consequently, when they have to mention a 
particular patient (whose name they may not even recall), the malady or 
procedure suggests itself as an obvious reference point. 
Id. at 29–31. 
 166. Langacker uses his Yorick and Polonius example, supra note 164, to illustrate 
this principle as well as the previous one.  Langacker, Reference-Point Constructions, supra 
note 137, at 30. 
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this principle to what he calls the active-zone/profile discrepancy.167  In a 
sentence like “The dog bit the cat,” the dog as a whole and the cat as a 
whole are profiled (or highlighted by the explicit mention), even 
though the active zones (or parts of the dog doing the biting and parts 
of the cat being bitten) are much more specific.  Langacker tells us 
that it is “normal,” “natural,” “expected” and “common” for the active 
zones to be left unprofiled.  It would be bizarre for a person to say, 
instead, “The dog’s teeth, jaws, jaw muscles, and volition bit that 
portion of the cat’s tail extending from six to twelve centimeters from 
the tip.”168  To be sure, such a sentence would be more accurate, but 
“there is a tension between the need to be accurate and our inclination 
to focus explicit attention on those entities that most concern us and 
have the greatest cognitive salience.”169  Referring to the entity as a 
whole focuses attention on it, and “general knowledge and contextual 
frames”170 tacitly supply the remainder of the desired accuracy.  To us 
today, it is a crashingly obvious point that persons in an earlier era 
without ready modern communications could not have effects on a 
place without being in that place.  And to a judge of that early era who 
was announcing the service-while-present rule, that same point—while 
not obvious, in the same way that water is non-obvious to a fish—would 
have certainly been squarely within the judge’s subconscious “general 
knowledge and contextual frames.” 
Radden and Kövecses identify CAUSE FOR EFFECT as a common 
metonymic pattern, giving as an example a person saying “healthy 
complexion” instead of “the good state of health bringing about the 
effect of healthy complexion.”171  A person, or his or her presence, is, of 
course, often a cause of effects on his or her surroundings, and indeed 
as already seen it is difficult to imagine such effects happening in the 
person’s absence.  Relatedly, Radden and Kövecses identify AGENT FOR 
                                               
 167. Ronald W. Langacker, Active Zones, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH ANNUAL 
MEETING OF THE BERKELEY LINGUISTICS SOCIETY 172 (1984) [hereinafter Langacker, 
Active Zones]; Langacker, Reference-Point Constructions, supra note 137, at 31–35.  He also 
explains, on the other hand, that the active-zone/profile discrepancy is not limited to 
part/whole relationships.  Id. at 32–33. 
 168. Id. at 32 (emphasis omitted). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Radden & Kövecses, supra note 4, at 38, 47 (emphasis omitted).  Here they suggest 
that the contrary pattern, EFFECT FOR CAUSE, may be more natural because effects are more 
perceptible than causes, but I submit that where the cause is a human being and the effect 
is not, CAUSE FOR EFFECT is actually more natural in keeping with Langacker’s point about 
the salience of humans.  See supra notes 158–165 and accompanying text. 
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ACTION as a further common metonymical pattern, giving as examples 
the phrase “to author a new book” and “to butcher the cow.”172  (Other 
authors identify similar subpatterns, including CONTROLLER FOR 
CONTROLLED173 and PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT.174).  For a judge to refer 
to the defendant him- or herself, rather than to the effects of the 
defendant’s actions, is, of course, nicely consistent with these patterns. 
And finally for this Section’s purposes is the relationship between 
place and event.  Markert and Nissim observe that “[a] location name 
stands for something that happened there.”175  They give as one clear 
example a sentence naming “Bosnia and so on” when the target is the 
war that took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995.176  
Similarly, in a sentence like “He was shocked by Vietnam,” “the name 
of the location refers to the event (a war) that happened there.”177  
Radden and Kövecses articulate a broader version of the same idea, 
illustrating it with similar location/event examples: 
Metonymy tends to make use of stereotypical, or idealized, relationships 
within an ICM.  Thus, certain places tend to be associated with events 
which typically occur at the place.  For example, the expression to go to 
bed may, depending on the situation, evoke the metonymic targets ‘to 
go to sleep,’ ‘to have sex’ or ‘to be sick.’  All these events are 
stereotypically associated with beds . . . .  More generally, we may 
describe the conceptual relationship between space and event as one 
that is entrenched and may be exploited by metonymy.178 
The application of this pattern, too, to PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS is 
clear.  The jurisdiction of the early judge articulating the service-while-
                                               
 172. Radden & Kövecses, supra note 4, at 37–38; see also BEATRICE WARREN, SENSE 
DEVELOPMENTS:  A CONTRASTIVE STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SLANG SENSES AND 
NOVEL STANDARD SENSES IN ENGLISH 65, 67 (1992) (giving examples of “causer-result” 
and “result-causer” metonymies).  Radden and Kövecses note that their examples 
involve changes of word class (for example, the vehicle noun author is being used as a 
verb to describe the target action of writing), and that such changes are typical but not 
universal.  Radden & Kövecses, supra note 4, at 38. 
 173. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY, supra note 132, at 38 (giving 
examples such as “Nixon bombed Hanoi” and “Ozawa gave a terrible concert last night”). 
 174. Id. (giving examples such as “I’ll have a Löwenbräu” and “He’s got a Picasso in 
his den”); see also NEAL R. NORRICK, SEMIOTIC PRINCIPLES IN SEMANTIC THEORY 45–52 
(1981) (providing a taxonomy of types of metonymy including producer/artifact, 
cause/effect, natural source/natural product, and instrument/product). 
 175. Katja Markert & Malvina Nissim, Corpus-Based Metonymy Analysis, 18 METAPHOR 
& SYMBOL 175, 180 (2003). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 175. 
 178. Radden & Kövecses, supra note 4, at 22 (emphasis omitted). 
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present rule is the place, used as the vehicle.  The defendant’s contacts 
with that place are, I argue, the target.  And it is just as conceptually 
natural for the judge to speak in terms of the defendant being present 
(meaning that the defendant has had adequate contacts) as it is for a 
political observer to say that he is “shocked by Vietnam” (meaning 
shocked by the events that took place there). 
As one should absolutely expect in light of metonymy’s imaginative 
and contextual nature, the particular patterns of salience examined 
above are only a few among “a host” of metonymical patterns.179  But 
these particular patterns are not random.  On the contrary, they all fit 
within certain more overarching notions from metonymy theory which 
further bolster this Article’s hypothesis. 
For example, metonymy theory tells us that a more concrete vehicle 
is more likely to be chosen for a more abstract target.  Radden and 
Kövecses observe that “[o]ur basic human experience relates to 
concrete physical objects, which have more salience for us than abstract 
objects,”180 using this idea to explain why people say things like “having 
one’s hands on something” instead of “controlling something.”181  The 
defendant’s physical body is of course more concrete than most of the 
remotely-caused effects (a broken promise, an economic loss, an 
infringed patent) that he or she has caused in the jurisdiction.  Radden 
and Kövecses add that one subcase of the preference for concrete over 
abstract is the bodily over the actional, accounting for phrases like “hold 
your tongue” for the target of “stop speaking.”182  Here, too, the 
significance of the defendant’s body is clear. 
Similarly, an immediate vehicle is more likely to be chosen for a non-
immediate target, so that speakers or writers tend to use metonymies 
based on “stimuli in our spatial, temporal and causal immediacy.”183  
Radden and Kövecses give the example of “I’ll answer the phone” for 
“I’ll answer the person speaking at the other end of the line” as being 
motivated by spatial immediacy, and, of course, the service-while-
present rule involves the defendant’s immediacy to the court—not 
only spatially, because the defendant is present in the jurisdiction, but 
                                               
 179. Riemer, supra note 131, at 382. 
 180. Radden & Kövecses, supra note 4, at 45; see also Langacker, Reference-Point 
Constructions, supra note 137, at 30 (identifying concrete over abstract as a principle of 
cognitive salience). 
 181. For more on this particular example in the legal context, see supra note 128 
and accompanying text. 
 182. Radden & Kövecses, supra note 4, at 45. 
 183. Id. at 47. 
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also temporally,  because the defendant’s presence is measured at the 
time of the service. 
In concluding this section, one should briefly note that there are 
similar metonymic expressions along the lines of PRESENCE FOR 
CONTACTS in today’s everyday non-legal discourse.184  One friend 
offering comfort to another will say, “I’m there for you,” even if 
speaking by phone from thousands of miles away, and in this case the 
vehicle of being “there” evokes the target of having certain effects, 
namely emotional support.  During the 1990s, the gay rights activist 
group Queer Nation popularized the slogan “We’re here, we’re queer, 
get used to it”185 with the vehicle of being “here” evoking targets such 
as the assertion of social and political power.  Conversely, a vehicle of 
absence can evoke targets of disengagement, as with Timothy Leary’s 
counterculture slogan “Turn On, Tune In, Drop Out.”186  No doubt 
the examples could be multiplied. 
3.  The analogy of children’s naming efforts 
As already seen, most or all uses of metonymy are based on 
convenience or usefulness, but these terms should not be taken only 
in a trivial sense.  Certain instances of metonymy usage are so 
extremely convenient and useful that they are, in effect, indispensable.  
Two instances should be examined here, which are in fact analogous 
to each other in important ways:  first, a judge who is wrestling with a 
new legal concept, the contours of which have not yet become clear, 
and second, a child who is still at an early stage of language acquisition.  
Using the idea of distributed cognition, this subsection of the Article 
argues that a judge’s metonymical wrestling with a not-fully-developed 
                                               
 184. Certain parallels in law as opposed to everyday discourse are addressed in 
Section III.C below, and the problem of instances from judicial discourse about 
personal jurisdiction in particular during the pre-Pennoyer period is addressed in 
Section II.B.3. 
 185. See Susan Stryker, Queer Nation, GLBTQ ENCYCLOPEDIA (2004), 
http://www.glbtqarchive.com/ssh/queer_nation_S.pdf. 
 186. See TIMOTHY LEARY, FLASHBACKS:  A PERSONAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY OF AN ERA 
253 (1983): 
Turn On meant go within to activate your neural and genetic equipment . . . .  
Tune In meant interact harmoniously with the world around you . . . .  Drop Out 
suggested an active, selective, graceful process of detachment from involuntary 
or unconscious commitments.  Drop Out meant self-reliance, a discovery of one’s 
singularity, a commitment to mobility, choice, and change . . . .  Unhappily my 
explanations of this sequence of personal development were often 
misinterpreted to mean “get stoned and abandon all constructive activity.” 
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concept is closely analogous to a child’s metonymical grasping for a 
not-fully-rounded vocabulary.  This analogy provides further support 
for this Article’s hypothesis that early judges, in announcing the 
service-while-present rule, were grasping for a concept that in fact was 
more nuanced, but that the judges did not yet have the historical 
perspective necessary to grasp. 
All adults have smiled to see a toddler exclaim “Doggie!” upon 
seeing a horse or a rhinoceros, when the toddler does not yet know the 
vocabulary words “horse” or “rhinoceros.”  The toddler presses into 
service what limited vocabulary she has, in order to deal with situations 
that are new to her—an extending of words beyond their accepted 
definitions that is structurally similar to metonymy.  Indeed, Professors 
Nerlich, Clarke, and Todd, examining a corpus of such expressions by 
children up to age two and a half, call the expressions “compelled 
metonymical overextensions.”187  They explain that “at this age a child’s 
vocabulary, category and conceptual systems are still relatively small and 
unstructured.  This scarcity compels them to extend already known 
words to cope with increasing communicative needs, to comment on 
what they see and to request what they want.”188  Giving a number of 
examples of children’s metonymical overextensions, Nerlich and her co-
authors summarize that children with limited lexicons: 
[f]ocus on one salient feature in a set framework or frame of 
repeated interactions with the caregiver or parent.  They say book if 
they want to read, blow when referring to a match, they say hello for 
telephone, and so on.  Gradually, through interaction with the 
caregiver or parent who grants their requests, the children elaborate 
on their comments.  Finally, the metonymical overextensions, which 
function as place-markers in the interactional and conceptual 
                                               
 187. Nerlich et al., supra note 8, at 364.  Nerlich and her co-authors also explore a 
second metonymical pattern in children’s language, which they call “creative 
metonymical shrinking.”  Id. at 369.  This pattern is based more on simple convenience 
than on necessity and is exemplified by the “I like being a sandwich” phrase in the 
article’s title, which is a child’s convenient way of referring to having the ability to 
bring his own lunch to school.   
 188. Id. at 364.  We could say that the nature of a child’s groping metonymy is that 
it underspecifies the concept in question, or by the same token, it over-extends the 
category.  The child thinks that the category of doggie only has one criterion for 
membership, namely having four legs.  A more mature understanding is that there are 
other criteria, too, such as barking.  The child has two related reasons for over-
extending the concept:  a limited vocabulary and a limited range of experiences on 
which to base recognition of the need for additional words. 
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frameworks, will be replaced by the ‘proper’ words allocated them 
by the adults, such as read, match and telephone.189 
Now obviously the judges who developed the service-while-present 
rule had fine and nuanced vocabularies.  These early judges were also 
surely unlike toddlers in being worldly gentlemen with extensive 
experience of the then prevailing society.  Nonetheless, at a deeper 
level, there is a sound analogy here:  the early judges are to judges of 
the modern era as children are to adults.  The early judges simply lacked 
experience of future evolutions in communications and cross-border 
business transactions much as children lack life experience.  As two 
writers on metonymy have noted, “our perception of the world is 
inseparable from our experience and cognition,”190 and the overarching 
fact of any person’s historical era is obviously a compelling factor 
helping to constitute that person’s experience. 
To spell out the rest of the logic, then, the early judges’ historical 
situation caused them to lack the associated vocabulary or conceptual 
structure with which to discriminate among the concepts of presence 
in a jurisdiction, contacts with the jurisdiction, and presence in the 
jurisdiction not generating minimum contacts with it.  Hence, the early 
judges were unable to articulate the concept of minimum contacts with 
anything approaching the degree of nuance by which we know that 
concept today.191  Instead, they metonymically overextended their only 
                                               
 189. Id. at 369; see also RAYMOND W. GIBBS, JR., THE POETICS OF MIND:  FIGURATIVE 
THOUGHT, LANGUAGE, AND UNDERSTANDING 422–24 (1994) (discussing children’s 
invention of verbs from nouns “to fill gaps in their lexicon in particular communicative 
situations”); Ewa Konieczna & Grzegorz A. Kleparski, In Search of Evidence for 
Metonymically Motivated Innovative Nouns in Children’s Speech, 2 SKASE J. THEORETICAL 
LINGUISTICS 43 (2005) (discussing similar children’s neologisms in English and 
Polish).  On the topic of children’s comprehension rather than usage of metonymic 
expressions, see Gabriella Rundblad & Dagmara Annaz, Development of Metaphor and 
Metonymy Comprehension:  Receptive Vocabulary and Conceptual Knowledge, 28 BRIT. J. 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 547, 549 (2010).  
 190. Konieczna & Kleparski, supra note 189, at 44–45 (quoting in this context Immanuel 
Kant’s dictum from Critique of Pure Reason, “we see things not as they are but as we are”). 
 191. In noticing the early judges’ inability to articulate a concept, one might 
compare them not only to children but also to adults who truly lack linguistic ability, 
i.e. aphasics.  In retrospect, it is wonderfully sensible that Roman Jakobson examined 
metonymy and metaphor in the context of aphasia.  See supra note 131.  After all, any 
person who lacks adequately precise literal language will naturally resort to 
approximations such as metonymy and metaphor; cf. Jeanne L. Schroeder & David 
Gray Carlson, The Appearance of Right and the Essence of Wrong:  Metaphor and Metonymy 
in Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2481, 2515 (2003) (remarking in a different context that 
metonymy “is the attempt to invoke indirectly that which cannot be captured directly,” 
and that it is used for describing “parts of the signified, or that which surrounds or 
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available vocabulary, namely that of simple physical presence.192  In a 
later era, when social developments had made it necessary and feasible, 
the International Shoe Court achieved a greater vocabulary.  As a historical 
matter, then, the hypothesis is strongly inviting:  tag jurisdiction has 
always been a rhinoceros that early judges called a doggie. 
Moreover, this analogy between toddlers and the judges of the past 
is supported by the powerful theory known as distributed cognition.  
In his landmark book, Cognition in the Wild,193 Edwin Hutchins shows 
that organized groups have cognitive properties that are different from 
those of the individuals comprising the group.  The organization can 
be thought of as a single cognizing entity, effectively a form of mind 
that is not confined to a single individual’s body.194  Focusing on the 
navigation of a large American war ship, Hutchins shows how the labor 
of cognition is distributed, both over space (for example, among the 
                                               
accompanies it, or the traces of its retreat”).  For other discussions involving 
metonymy, see Jeanne L. Schroeder, Never Jam To-day:  On the Impossibility of Takings 
Jurisprudence, 84 GEO. L.J. 1531, 1553 (1996); Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Laconomics of 
Apples and Oranges:  A Speculative Analysis of the Economic Concept of Commensurability, 15 
YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 347, 377–80 (2003); Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, 
Law’s Non-Existent Empire, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 767, 784–85 (2003). 
 192. It is not this Article’s business to assert as a matter of historical linguistics that this is 
in fact how the concept came to be.  Indeed, it would surely be difficult for anyone to ever 
unearth proof of the subconscious thought processes of judges who are now long dead.  See 
generally infra Section III.A.  Instead this Article simply suggests that it is a reasonable and even 
compelling hypothesis, especially in light of the absence of other justifications. 
  This same hypothesis helps to shed light on the writ of capias ad respondendum, 
discussed supra note 59 and accompanying text.  The writ is more a predecessor of 
modern service-of-process rules than of modern personal jurisdiction rules.  (Indeed, 
the fact that the capias writ has now “given way to personal service of summons or other 
form of notice” helps substantiate the pervasiveness of metaphor and metonymy in law.  
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (emphasis added).  The modern 
device is called a “summons” because, like the writ, it compels the defendant to make an 
“appearance” in court, albeit no longer necessarily in a bodily sense.  To the judges of 
the early era in which the writ was used, making decisions based on their experience and 
historical situatedness (including notably the relative absence at that time of well-
developed alternatives) it would have seemed natural to require a defendant to be bodily 
present in court for the purpose of answering the complaint. 
  For a descriptive perspective on the diachronic aspects of metonymy, not 
relying on this Article’s analogy to distributed cognition, see Konieczna & Kleparski, 
supra note 189, at 50 and sources cited, describing the need to name new 
“technological developments within a particular society.” 
 193. EDWIN HUTCHINS, COGNITION IN THE WILD 175–76 (1995). 
 194. Distributed cognition can be thought of in terms of the mass/multiplex image 
schema, which the author explores in detail in a different context elsewhere.  See Coles-
Bjerre, supra note 160, at 373. 
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many sailors and other individuals at several stations on the vessel) and 
over time (for example, with the individuals taking advantage of 
records and tools that were built up by their predecessors over the 
years).195  I submit that the development of case law, similarly, is 
another paradigmatic example of distributed cognition over time.  A 
law library is a set of tools (an “external representation,” as Hutchins 
says) analogous to the measurements and devices used in navigation, 
and the presiding judge in any given case at bar draws on the 
accumulated wisdom of his or her past colleagues.196 
There is nothing pejorative, then, about analogizing the pre-Pennoyer 
judges to toddlers in their use of metonymy:  it is simply a fact that the 
earlier judges’ work contributes to the outcomes of today’s judges’ 
cases, but not vice versa. 
III.  OH NO!  IT’S NEITHER LIVE NOR DEAD! 
With “dead metonymy” being a metaphor,197 the entailments of that 
metaphor suggest that a dead metonymy or dead metonymic expression 
must once have been alive.198  And some theorists take this proposition 
for granted.199  But the metonymy of PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS presents 
a troublesome case for testing the proposition, and therein lies much of 
                                               
 195. “In an external representation, structure can be built up gradually—a 
distribution of cognitive effort over time—so that the final product may be something 
that no individual could represent all at once internally.”  HUTCHINS, supra note 193, 
at 96.  For example, the chart that a navigator uses is a product of “more observations 
than any one person could make in a lifetime” and “is an artifact that embodies 
generations of experience and measurement.”  Id. at 111. 
 196. Others have written about other aspects of law as distributed cognition, for 
example the trial process: 
Take a court of law. Its purpose is explicitly cognitive:  to determine, beyond 
reasonable doubt, the truth-value of certain propositions (X is guilty of crime 
C).  To do so, a number of individuals have specific roles to play, each of them 
cognitive . . . .  The system is so built that, when everything works well (which is 
not always the case), none of the beliefs of the individuals involved determines the 
outcome.  The decision process is, in some sense, supra-individual.  As a 
cognitive process, evaluating the truth of the propositions is a system-level affair. 
Pierre Poirier & Guillaume Chicoisne, A Framework for Thinking About Distributed 
Cognition, 14 PRAGMATICS & COGNITION 215, 215–16 (2006). 
 197. See Langacker, Active Zones, supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 198. For a discussion of the aliveness or deadness of metaphorical and metonymic 
expressions, see supra notes 167–173 and accompanying text. 
 199. E.g., DAN FASS, PROCESSING METONYMY AND METAPHOR 49 (1997) (“Dead 
metaphors and metonymies were formerly alive, but their meanings have become 
frozen or fossilized in word senses and phrases.”). 
2018] A LINGUISTIC CRITIQUE OF TAG JURISDICTION 53 
 
its value for legal as opposed to linguistic analysis.  This Part of the 
Article suggests that the metonymy of PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS is neither 
live nor dead, but rather, a disturbing and poorly understood middle 
ground between live and dead.  The metonymy lurches undead through 
the law, leaving destruction in its path, like a zombie. 
A.  The Undead Among Us 
One very standard type of argument used by lawyers and legal 
academics is based on the intentions of those who formulated a rule.  
For example, statutory interpretation depends heavily on the intent of 
the legislature; contractual interpretation depends heavily on the 
intent of the parties; and the original intent of the framers is a robust 
school of constitutional interpretation as well.200  So, it is perhaps not 
surprising that when first hearing this Article’s hypothesis that the 
service-while-present rule was a primitive metonymy for minimum 
contacts, some lawyers and legal academics have responded 
“Interesting—is that what the cases say?”  This response is 
disappointing because, as careful readers will already realize, it misses 
the fundamental point of this Article’s hypothesis that the formulation 
of the service-while-present rule was subconscious.  Judges reached for 
the defendant’s presence in the jurisdiction as a subconscious 
substitution for the much more abstract (and, at the time, difficult to 
conceptualize) criterion of the defendant having minimum contacts 
with the jurisdiction.  If those early judges had shared the historical 
vantage point of the International Shoe Court and later judges, and had, 
therefore, been able to conceptualize the minimum contacts rule in 
literal terms, they would have done so. 
Thus, one naturally searches in vain for nineteenth century judicial 
pronouncements about a defendant’s presence in the jurisdiction 
being more or less equivalent to the defendant having sufficient 
contacts therewith.  To imagine judges of the pre-Pennoyer era explicitly 
ruminating about the comparability of presence and contacts is just as 
absurd as imagining a coffee shop server consciously planning to refer 
to the ham sandwich rather than the customer.201  Such a judicial 
opinion would have to say, for example, “This court is presented with 
a non-domiciliary defendant who was served while present within this 
state’s borders and who, unsurprisingly in light of the non-transitory 
                                               
 200. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. 
L.J. 281, 284 (1989). 
 201. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
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nature of that presence in the current era of history, has had 
substantial contacts with this state related to the cause of action.  But, 
it would be tedious and relatively difficult to articulate the details of 
those contacts, and hence, for convenience in the remainder of this 
opinion, we shall simply refer to the defendant as having been 
‘present’.”202  This Article is not based on any such explicit statements 
gleaned from case-crunching.  Whether PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS had 
an initial “conscious” stage is not this Article’s concern,203 though by 
now it should be clear to the reader that the cognitive theory at work 
here would strongly suggest a negative answer.  The pre-Pennoyer judges 
would not have been conscious of their thoughts along these lines any 
more than the coffee-shop server above, or the toddler doing his or 
her best to label the rhinoceros.204 
But the fact that PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS was always subconscious 
does not mean that it was never “live,” or even that it is now “dead.”  If 
this Article’s hypothesis is correct, then the metonymy was certainly 
and obviously live at the time that the pre-Pennoyer judges developed 
the service-while-present rule.  (As just explored, scholars of the present 
era cannot know directly what was in the early judges’ minds, but it is vastly 
more natural to suppose that when those judges referred to presence, it 
was a clumsy early attempt at naming something more flexible, rather 
than a consciously wooden selection of a criterion that is hard to justify on 
its own terms.)  Moreover, the metonymy is not “dead” now, in the sense 
of being conventionalized; that is, no one would argue that the linkage 
of presence and contacts has become a standardized extension of the 
                                               
 202. And a concurrence to such an opinion might run like this:  “Though I join my 
learned brethren in thinking that the reference to presence is a useful simplification 
in the case at hand, I am concerned that the mechanistic application of such a 
formulation to future cases, in which a defendant’s presence might be much more 
transitory because of as-yet uninvented advances in transportation, would create 
problematic assertions of power.” 
 203. Historians of linguistics or of jurisprudence who want to pursue this line of inquiry 
might want to look into the works of Ulrich Huber and their antecedents, among other 
sources.  See, e.g., James Weinstein, The Dutch Influence on the Conception of Judicial Jurisdiction 
in 19th Century America, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 73 (1990).  The answer is probably that this 
metonymy never was conscious, and if such is the case, it supports this Article’s thesis. 
 204. Cf. Andrea Coles-Bjerre, Ipso Facto:  The Pattern of Assumable Contracts in 
Bankruptcy, 40 N.M. L. REV. 77, 117–18 (2010) (establishing the subconscious nature 
of judicial categorization related to ipso facto clauses); Coles-Bjerre, supra note 160, at 
373–76 (critiquing judicial policy-making that, while purportedly relying on plain 
meaning, is subconsciously motivated by policy preference). 
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literal meaning of “present” or any other related word.205  (In today’s 
usages such as “I’m there for you,”206 the metonymy is live although 
unconscious.) 
Even so, the PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS metonymy does have a dead 
aspect, in that its effect today—notably in Burnham and similar tag 
jurisdiction cases—is fixed, or frozen, or conventionalized in the 
service-while-present rule.  In other words, the rule itself is fixed and 
conventionalized, even if the underlying metonymy that gave birth to 
the rule is not.  As explored next, this is a disturbing—some would say 
horrifying—middle ground between life and death. 
B.  The Destructive Effects of an Undead Rule 
Although live and dead metonymies impede ordinary human 
communication only to an extent that is virtually unnoticeable,207 the 
result can be very different when a live metonymy cloaks itself in a half-
dead and decaying rule of law.  The PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS 
metonymy, in particular, morphs into Burnham’s tag jurisdiction rule, 
which wreaks destruction on innocent defendants.208 
In jurisprudence we have long been aware of the dangerous 
potential of metaphor.  Cardozo famously wrote, “Metaphors in law are 
to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they 
end often by enslaving it.”209  And the great Realist legal philosopher 
Felix Cohen wrote: 
                                               
 205. See supra notes 138–144 and accompanying text (explaining dead metonymy 
in terms of conventionalization). 
 206. See supra notes 183–186 and accompanying text (discussing PRESENCE FOR 
CONTACTS metonymic expression in everyday non-legal discourse). 
 207. One of Section II.A’s underlying premises was that people are so good at 
understanding metonymic communication in ordinary conversation and other non-legal 
discourse.  In fact, one test that has been used to explore both metaphor and metonymy 
is to measure the reaction time of the hearer or reader, but even when the metaphor or 
metonymy does cause a reaction time, it is measured in milliseconds.  See Steven Frisson 
& Martin J. Pickering, The Processing of Metonymy:  Evidence from Eye Movements, 25 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:  LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 1366, 1366 (1999). 
 208. The Author has elsewhere also highlighted the unusual degree to which 
otherwise purely linguistic concerns can take on great practical importance in the 
judicial process.  See Coles-Bjerre, supra note 160, at 327–28 (noting that the 
interpretation of an ambiguous expression as referring to a whole or to a part causes 
little problem “in daily life,” but “in law, and in the judicial process in particular, 
concerns of systemic legitimacy, transparency and soundness of reasoning demand 
that the subconscious choices be recognized and articulated”). 
 209. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926). 
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When the vivid fictions and metaphors of traditional jurisprudence 
are thought of as reasons for decisions, rather than poetical or 
mnemonic devices for formulating decisions reached on other 
grounds, then the author, as well as the reader, of the opinion or 
argument, is apt to forget the social forces which mold the law and 
the social ideals by which the law is to be judged.210 
These same pernicious effects can flow from metonymy rather than 
metaphor—and PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS, as used in Scalia’s Burnham 
concurrence, is a prime example.  In keeping with Cohen, we have 
already seen how metonymy, like metaphor, is indeed a “poetical or 
mnemonic device” but also, and much more powerfully, a 
subconscious vehicle for thought.  And the central doctrinal point 
about Burnham is that the service-while-present rule, though seemingly 
unproblematic during the historical era in which it was formulated, 
should not have been woodenly extended when later “social forces” led 
to the phenomenon of tag jurisdiction. 
In American law we are not accustomed to simply taking for granted 
conclusions that were reached a hundred years ago.  And in particular, if 
a century-old conclusion was initially reached by means of metaphor or 
metonymy, we in the present age should re-examine whether the 
mapping or contiguity that led to it remains persuasive.  To close the 
books on a metaphor or metonymy and treat it as literal, is to put out of 
bounds for today’s reconsideration the legitimacy of the imaginative 
choices that were made long ago.  Yesterday’s creativity becomes today’s 
shackle.  The rule’s reasoning is dead, yet the rule itself lives—the horror! 
Professors Lakoff and Turner discuss a particular metonymy that 
helps to further illuminate the harm that can flow from metonymy in 
the context of legal rules: 
There is a general metonymy that words stand for the concepts they 
express . . . .  In a sentence like “Those are foolish words,” the words 
are taken as referring, via metonymy, to the concept expressed by 
the words, which are being called foolish. [ . . . ]  When the 
distinction between the words and their conceptual content is clear, 
there is no harm in using this metonymy . . . [but] confusion arises 
when the metonymy goes unnoticed and no distinction is made 
between the words in themselves and concepts they express.211 
                                               
 210. Cohen, supra note 57, at 812. 
 211. LAKOFF & TURNER, supra note 138, at 108; see also Radden & Kövecses, supra 
note 5, at 42, 46 (stating that words for the concepts they express is a subcase of the 
metonymic salience of the concrete over the abstract). 
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Lakoff and Turner’s immediate point here is twofold.  First, that 
metaphorical expressions, which are linguistic, are different from 
metaphors, which are conceptual.212  And second, that non-experts 
often use the term “metaphor” to refer, metonymically, to 
metaphorical expressions.213  But this same point also has a much 
broader resonance for purposes of this Article.  In law, the result of 
failing to keep in mind a metonymy is not only “confusion” (though 
that is part of the problem) but, more to the point, bad law—like an 
improper assertion of judicial power.214 
The great novelist William Faulkner famously said, “The past is never 
dead.  It’s not even past.”215  When a metonymy generates a legal rule, 
and then judges apply that legal rule literally, even when the reasons for 
the original metonymy have weakened, the result is not a dead 
metonymy but a zombie metonymy.  It is as if the judges’ brains have 
been partially devoured. 
The zombie-like nature of American law under Burnham is 
highlighted by contrasting it with ongoing international negotiations 
                                               
 212. See supra note 128 (discussing this distinction). 
 213. Hence, in Lakoff and Turner’s formulation as just quoted, “words” such as 
metaphor, when used by non-experts, metonymically stand for “the concept[]” of 
metaphor as understood by linguists. 
 214. The field of Zombie Legal Studies is new, but it is lurching relentlessly along.  
See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib & Zev J. Eigen, Consumer Form Contracting in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction:  The Unread and the Undead, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 65 (2017); Andrea Clark, 
Amidst the Walking Dead:  Judicial and Nonjudicial Approaches for Eradicating Zombie 
Mortgages, 65 EMORY L.J. 795 (2016); Sutton James Smith, Zombie Powers of Attorney:  The 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 2006 and the Undead Power of Attorney for Health Care, 39 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 285 (2014); Julie E. Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 56 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1119 (2015); Neil L. Sobol, Protecting Consumers from Zombie-Debt Collectors, 44 
N.M. L. REV. 327 (2014); Adam P. Segal, Zombie Copyrights:  Copyright Restoration under 
the New 104A of the Copyright Act, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 71 
(1997); see also Stempel, supra note 99, at 1255 (remarking at the end of the article that 
tag jurisdiction survives “[l]ike something from a bad zombie movie”); Kickstarter 
Campaign for Zombie Law:  Zombies in the Federal Courts, a casebook, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/888628681/zombie-law-zombies-in-the-federal 
-courts-a-caseboo (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (raising funds for a legal casebook collecting 
federal court cases using the word zombie).  Zombielaw, www.zombielaw.wordpress.com 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (blogging on “zombies in law, politics and current events”). 
  Most of the Zombie Legal Studies publications to date have focused briefly on 
various once-dead, now-live aspects of their subject matter, without probing into the half-
dead aspects of the related judicial reasoning, linguistic or otherwise.  Leib & Eigen, above, 
is an exception and builds nicely on Grant Gilmore’s famous pronouncement about the 
“death of contract.”  See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (2d ed. 1995). 
 215. WILLIAM F. FAULKNER & RUTH FORD, REQUIEM FOR A NUN, act 1, sc. 3, at 33 (1950). 
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being conducted under the auspices of the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law.216  These negotiations are part of what has 
proven to be a very lengthy multilateral project to draft a Convention217 
on the recognition and enforcement of judgments internationally218—
and tag jurisdiction is conspicuously absent from the current draft 
Convention.219  Kevin Clermont, a leader in the field of courts’ 
                                               
 216. The Hague Conference has eighty-two nation members, from Albania to 
Zambia, plus the European Union which belongs to the conference as a Regional 
Economic Integration Organization.  See HCCH Members, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON 
PRIVATE INT’L LAW, https://www.hcch.net/en/states/hcch-members (last visited Oct. 
17, 2018).  It first met in 1893 on the initiative of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Tobias 
Michel Karel Asser, and became a permanent inter-governmental organization in 
1955.  See A World Organisation . . . , HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW,  . . .  . . . 
https://www.hcch.net/en/about (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
 217. A convention is a multilateral agreement among nations.  See Convention, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 405 (10th ed. 2014). 
 218. See The Permanent Bureau, Continuation of the Judgments Project, HAGUE 
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW 3 (Feb. 2010) https://assets.hcch.net/docs/cd5f7 
9f4-d710-44a1-a266-af0e73a6ffb4.pdf (discussing “the variety of jurisdictional practices 
and approaches to [international] recognition and enforcement” to facilitate cross-
border effects of judgments). 
 219. See Special Commission on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments:  
February 2017 Draft Convention, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW 1, 3–5 (Feb. 
2017) [hereinafter February 2017 Draft], https://assets.hcch.net/docs/d6f58225-0427-
4a65-8f8b-180e79cafdbb.pdf (setting forth the proposed “[b]ases for recognition and 
enforcement” of a judgment, Article 5 of the draft Convention omits any reference to 
service while the defendant is present in the jurisdiction). 
  More pointedly, earlier drafts of the Convention affirmatively abjured tag 
jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and the Effects of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW 9–
10 (Oct. 30, 1999), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd11.pdf (prohibiting 
jurisdiction based on “the service of a writ upon the defendant in that State”); Russell 
J. Weintraub, How Substantial is Our Need for a Judgments-Recognition Convention and What 
Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 167, 189–90 (1998) (noting that 
“[the United States] will have to agree to black list tag jurisdiction if we want a 
convention”).  In the February 2017 Draft, the point is made only obliquely.  See 
February 2017 Draft at 6 (providing that a State, i.e. a nation adhering to the 
Convention, may refuse recognition or enforcement of a judgment if it “would be 
manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the requested State, including 
situations where the specific proceedings leading to the judgment were incompatible 
with fundamental principles of procedural fairness of that State”).  Cf. Russell J. 
Weintraub, Negotiating the Tort Long-Arm Provisions of the Judgments Convention, 61 ALB. 
L. REV. 1269, 1270, 1278 (1998) (noting that tag jurisdiction is blacklisted under the 
Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, reprinted as amended in 29 
I.L.M. 1413 (1990)).  Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations notes 
that in international litigation, “jurisdiction based on service of process on a person 
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territorial powers, notes that European nations regard transient 
presence as “too thin” a basis for asserting “any and all causes of 
action,” and opines that “[t]he Europeans are right on that point.”220 
Unfortunately, the prospects for an end to tag jurisdiction as a 
matter of U.S. law appear far from bright, based at least on the 
jurisprudence of Neil Gorsuch—Justice Scalia’s direct replacement on 
the bench.221  Two examples will have to suffice here.  First, now-Justice 
Gorsuch’s dissent in the infamous “frozen trucker” case (penned while 
he was still on the Tenth Circuit),222 is emblematic of his rejection 
rather than embrace of factors like intention, purpose, and social 
context in the judicial process.  Briefly, Alphonse Maddin was a truck 
driver who was stuck for hours in sub-zero January weather with frozen 
brakes.223  Numb and in fear of personal harm or death, Mr. Maddin 
unhitched the truck cab from the trailer, and drove briefly to a safe 
warming spot—contrary to his employer’s orders.224  The employer 
fired him for taking these precautions.225  A majority of the Tenth 
Circuit’s panel ruled that the firing was wrongful because federal law 
bars an employer from firing an employee who “refuses to operate a 
vehicle because . . . the employee has a reasonable apprehension of 
serious injury.”226  Then-Judge Gorsuch dissented because the statute 
protects only “refus[ing] to operate” a vehicle rather than “operating” 
it.227  The statute’s unmistakable purpose is to protect the health and 
safety of truckers—and as the facts show, this purpose can be just as 
                                               
only transitorily in the territory of the state, is not generally acceptable under 
international law.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 421 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 220. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation, supra note 22, at 96, 111.  For further 
discussion of the Hague Judgment project, see Justyna Regan, Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments—A Second Attempt in The Hague?, 14 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. 
& BUS. 63, 64, 82–86 (2015); Consultation Paper on the 2016 Preliminary Draft Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, INT’L LAW DIV. HONG KONG DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE 1, 5–11 (Oct. 2016), http://www.doj.gov.hk/eng/public/pdf/ 
2016/consultation_ild.pdf. 
 221. In addition to the replacement of Scalia by Gorsuch, the other eight Burnham 
Justices have also been replaced.  
 222. TransAm Trucking, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd., 833 F.3d 1206, 1215–17 (10th 
Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 223. Id. at 1208 (Murphy, J.). 
 224. Id. at 1208–09. 
 225. Id. at 1209. 
 226. 49 U.S.C. § 31105(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2012) (emphasis omitted). 
 227. TransAm, 833 F.3d at 1215–16 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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strongly implicated by operating as by not operating—but Judge 
Gorsuch refused to take account of the legislative purpose.228 
Our other convenient example is Justice Gorsuch’s first opinion as a 
Supreme Court Justice, Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.229  At 
issue was the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),230 
which protects consumers from threats, family harassment, abusive 
midnight phone calls, etc. on the part of a debt collector.231  But the 
statutory definition of “debt collector”232 is interesting.  It clearly 
includes an independent company hired by an auto dealer to collect 
what the consumer owes the auto dealer; and conversely, the term 
clearly excludes the auto dealer itself, collecting what the consumer 
owes to it.233  The statutory distinction is whether the debt is “owed or 
due . . . another,”234 and the congressionally declared purpose behind 
this distinction is that the auto dealer itself is usually “restrained by the 
desire to protect [its] good will when collecting past due accounts,” 
while independent companies are likely to have “no future contact 
with the consumer and often are unconcerned with the consumer’s 
opinion of them.”235  Santander involved a middle ground:  the consumer 
sought protection from a professional debt buyer that had acquired the 
debt from the auto dealer (instead of being hired by the auto dealer) 
trying to collect for itself (not for the auto dealer).236 
                                               
 228. “Even supposing all this is true, though, when the statute is plain it simply isn’t 
our business to appeal to legislative intentions.”  Id. at 1217.  For an incredulous and 
devastating mockery of then-Judge Gorsuch’s reasoning by then-Senator Al Franken 
during the confirmation hearings, see Paul Callan, Judge Gorsuch and the frozen truck 
driver, CNN (March 21, 2017, 5:27 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/21/ 
opinions/judge-gorsuch-the-frozen-truck-driver-opinion-callan.  For more on the 
case’s role in the confirmation hearings, see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Neil Gorsuch 
and the “Frozen Trucker,” SLATE (March 21, 2017, 10:38 AM), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/03/neil_gorsuch_s_arrogant_frozen
_trucker_opinion_shows_he_wants_to_be_like.html. 
 229. 137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017). 
 230. Pub. L. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–
1692p (2012)). 
 231. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1720. 
 232. See § 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (“any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate 
commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection 
of any debts . . . owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another” (emphasis added)). 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. F.T.C. v. Check Inv’rs, Inc., 502 F.3d 159, 173 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting S. Rep. 
No. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696–97). 
 236. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1720–21. 
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From the point of view of the consumer, the debt buyer is just like 
an independent company hired by an auto dealer:  no prior 
relationship, no likelihood of a future relationship, and thus 
“unconcerned with the consumer’s opinion of them.”237  But Justice 
Gorsuch, writing for a unanimous Court, relied almost solely on 
grammatical reasoning (notably, is the debt, originated by the auto 
dealer but now owned by the debt buyer, “owed or due . . . another”?), 
to find that the statute did not protect the consumer against the debt 
buyer.238  Thus, he ignored not only congressional purpose, but also 
the changing social landscape.  The FDCPA was enacted in 1977, at a 
time when there was not much of a professional debt buying 
industry.239  In the forty intervening years, the professional debt buying 
industry has exploded, accompanied by abuses that Congress—like the 
pre-Pennoyer judges—lacked the experience or vocabulary to articulate. 
The unpromising nature of the current Supreme Court’s outlook in no 
way diminishes the importance of this Article’s critique.  On the contrary, 
the prospect of a continuing conservative bench should make lawyers and 
others scrutinize the Court’s reasoning all the more carefully.  Plain 
meaning, strict construction, and the unreflective perpetuation of zombie 
metonymies are all forms of a judicial hands-off-ism that, as has been 
explained in this Section III.B, fails to do real justice. 
C.   Others Manage, So What Was Justice Scalia’s Excuse? 
The phenomenon of a metonymy being invented in one era and 
then ceasing to be appropriate with the passage of time is not unique 
to tag jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, civil procedure, or law.  But 
in the other contexts, language users have adapted by moving past the 
metonymy or by at least marginalizing the metonymy.  This fact makes 
the Scalia opinion in Burnham even more regrettable. 
In law, one very instructive example of flexibility in other bodies of 
law is the statute of frauds.  Already regarded as an “anachronism” 
decades ago,240 the statute of frauds has, for centuries, sought to ensure 
that only genuine contracts are sued on, by requiring plaintiffs to 
demonstrate the contract to be in writing and signed by the 
                                               
 237. Check Inv’rs, 502 F.3d at 173. 
 238. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1722–24. 
 239. Id. at 1724. 
 240. See Hugh Evander Willis, The Statute of Frauds—A Legal Anachronism, 3 IND. L.J. 
427, 429 (1928). 
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defendant.241  But as the electronic age arrived, difficulties arose in 
applying this writing-plus-signature rule.242  Courts struggled to define 
“writing” and “signing” without a physical paper contract.  In theory, 
our legal system could have continued applying the seventeenth-
century statute of frauds unchanged, but lawmakers have responded 
to the practical demands of changing social circumstances by enacting 
the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA),243 which gives legal 
effect to acts that are deemed the electronic equivalents of writings and 
signatures.244  In retrospect, this modern development has clarified 
that the initial impulse behind the statute of frauds was not to value 
writings and signatures for their own sake; rather, the initial impulse 
was to value writings and signatures as indications of “intent to sign” 
the contract.245  When new means of authenticating the contract 
became available, the law adjusted to move beyond its initial, 
physicalist, formulation.  The writing requirement stands revealed as 
never having been more than an initial, awkward metonymy (like 
“doggie”) for a more abstract concept. 
Of course, electronic records and electronic signatures are broader 
categories than writings and pen-on-paper signatures, but in 
retrospect, our modern experience with electronic signatures reveals 
that the old pre-UETA statute of frauds, not the new UETA, was over-
inclusive.  Consider the case of a celebrity who is asked to autograph a 
piece of paper, and who does so, but the piece of paper unbeknownst 
to the celebrity turns out to be a contract.  Counter-intuitively, if the 
celebrity’s duplicitous fan sues the celebrity on the contract, the 
                                               
 241. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 117 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 353, 353–405 (4th ed. 2004). 
 242. See Alison S. Brehm & Cathy D. Lee, From the Chair: “Click Here to Accept the Terms 
of Service,” 31 COMMC’N. LAW. (Jan. 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/publications/communications_lawyer/january2015/CL_Win15_v31n1.pdf 
(detailing the controversial nature of click-wrap agreements). 
 243. UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT (UETA) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999). 
 244. The statute’s terminology is “electronic record” and “electronic signature,” 
with the latter defined as “an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or 
logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent 
to sign the record.”  See UETA § 2(8) (1999).  As of this writing, the UETA has been 
adopted by forty-seven states, plus the District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands.  
See Legislative Fact Sheet—Electronic Transactions Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Electronic%20Transactions
%20Act (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
 245. Electronic Transactions Act Summary, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Electronic%20Transactions%2
0Act (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
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celebrity will not have a statute of frauds defense,  because traditional 
statutes of frauds, unlike UETA, have no “intent to sign” element.246  
Thus the traditional statutes of frauds were over-inclusive.  This is 
exactly the same characteristic of the service-while-present rule that 
regrettably validates tag jurisdiction. 
UETA prevents electronic signatures from being over-inclusive,247 
but it does not fix the longstanding over-inclusivity of the statute of 
frauds itself because it does not affect the validity of pen-and-paper 
signatures.  Thus even post-UETA the celebrity in the above example 
would still be bound by the contract that he or she unwittingly signed.  
This aspect of UETA, too, illuminates a weakness of Justice Scalia’s 
Burnham opinion.  Rather than invalidating tag jurisdiction using the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Scalia airily invites the states to 
achieve a similar effect by narrowing their own long-arm statutes.248  
Justice Brennan’s opinion calls this reliance on possible state-level 
action “misplaced,” because “[s]tates have little incentive to limit rules 
such as transient jurisdiction that make it easier for their own citizens 
to sue out-of-state defendants . . . .  Out-of-staters do not vote in state 
elections or have a voice in state government.”249  The UETA 
experience shows how well taken Brennan’s point is.  With UETA as 
opposed to the long-arm statutes, a thoughtful and effective uniform 
statutory drafting process was in place,250 and in addition, any of 
UETA’s forty-nine adopting legislatures had the opportunity to tweak 
and improve the uniform bill during the state-specific enactment 
                                               
 246. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(a) (2015) (requiring only that the agreement be 
“subscribed” by the party to be charged, without an intent element).  Nonetheless the 
contract would not be binding, at least in principle, because of general contract law’s 
requirement of intent to be bound.  But removing the statute of frauds defense means that 
no summary judgment will be available to the defendant and could even lead to a wrong 
result on the merits, depending on the parties’ credibility and on who can prove what.  Cf. 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 241, at 390 (noting that the modern test is whether the other party 
reasonably believes that the asserted signer had the intent to adopt the writing). 
 247. See supra note 243 (requiring “intent to sign”). 
 248. “We have conducted no independent inquiry into the desirability or fairness 
of the prevailing in-state service rule, leaving that judgment to the legislatures that are 
free to amend it . . . .”  Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990) (plurality 
opinion).  “Nothing we say today prevents individual States from limiting or entirely 
abandoning the in-state-service basis of jurisdiction.”  Id. at 627. 
 249. Id. at 639–40 n.14 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 250. See About the ULC, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx 
?title=About%20the%20ULC (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (describing the “deliberative 
and uniquely open drafting process” that underlies UETA and other Uniform Law 
Commission statutes). 
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process.251  Yet no state-level action directed against the statute of 
frauds’ longstanding over-inclusivity took place.252  As is so often true, 
but as Justice Scalia declined to consider, a decision about “forum” 
becomes in practice a decision about substance.253 
There are many other examples in law.  In old English property law, 
land was formerly transferred only by livery of seisin—literally the 
hand-to-hand passing of soil from the ground in question254—but in 
modern times this insistence on physicalism has been abandoned.  In 
criminal procedure, the remedy of habeas corpus was formerly 
available only when a prisoner was in custody of the courts,255 but in 
modern times, the law has moved away from this physicalist focus so 
that the remedy is also available to persons who are free on probation, 
parole, or the like.256  In commercial law, property rights of owners and 
secured parties with respect to assets like securities were historically 
determined principally by physical possession,257 but over the past 
twenty-five years or so this concept has been generalized to permit the 
property rights to be determined based on “control,” which while 
generally analogous to possession may also be narrower258 or 
broader.259  Other examples will doubtless occur to readers in their 
own fields of legal expertise. 
                                               
 251. See Patricia Brumfield Fry, A Preliminary Analysis of Federal and State Electronic 
Commerce Laws, UNIF. LAW COMM’N,  http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?titl 
e=UETA%20and%20Preemption%20Article (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) (discussing 
some of the changes made when states enacted the UETA). 
 252. Cf. Kenneth Chase, The Statute of Frauds in the Digital Age, LAW 360 (June 27, 
2014) (discussing the evolution of the statute of frauds over the past twenty years). 
 253. No pun intended. 
 254. See Livery of Seisin, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “livery of 
seisin” as “[t]he ceremony by which a grantor conveyed land to a grantee” and noting 
that it involved “either (1) going on the land and having the grantor symbolically 
deliver possession of the land to the grantee by handing over a twig, a clod of dirt, or 
a piece of turf (called livery in deed) or (2) going within sight of the land and having 
the grantor tell the grantee that possession was being given, followed by the grantee’s 
entering the land (called livery in law)”). 
 255. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
748, 754 (1986).  The term habeas corpus literally means “that you have the body.”  
Habeas Corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 256. Chemerinsky, supra note 255, at 754–55. 
 257. See James Steven Rogers, Negotiability as a System of Title Recognition, 38 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 197, 202–04 (1987). 
 258. See, e.g., U.C.C § 8-106(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2017) (imposing conditions in 
addition to possession for control of certificated securities in registered form). 
 259. See generally James Steven Rogers, Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C. Article 8, 43 
UCLA L. REV. 1431, 1481 (1996) (“Though the control concept may, at first 
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Quite apart from law, metonymies in daily life often become 
outdated, and people take this in stride without letting the metonymy 
constrain them.  Computer files used to be saved on “floppy discs,” and 
as a result even today, the “save” button on all of our Word toolbars is 
labeled with an icon of a floppy disc, even though that medium has 
been completely obsolete for the past several years.260  Similarly, 
automobile engines used to make a “vroom” sound when moving down 
the road, and when hybrid engines like that of a Toyota Prius became 
silent this became dangerous to pedestrians who were no longer 
warned by the noise.  Accordingly, the option arose for Prius owners 
to buy a special, artificial vrooming sound.261  Similar examples could 
again be easily multiplied—for example, election campaign billboards 
that show a check-mark next to a candidate’s name.  The floppy disc icon, 
the vrooming Prius, and the check-mark on the election campaign 
billboard are all metonymies, and probably even dead metonymies, but 
crucially, they do not have zombie effects.  This is because these 
metonymies are not woodenly adhered to, whether in the law or in any 
other coercive medium.  For example, no laptop user is confused or limited 
by today’s floppy disc icon; on the contrary, if we think about it at all, we see 
that the icon is a quaint throwback provided for convenience of reference 
only.  If only Justice Scalia had had the same insight about presence.262 
Metonymy is everywhere, and certainly not just in the law of personal 
jurisdiction.  Among the myriad metonymies in law and elsewhere, many 
                                               
examination, seem novel, it is, in fact, fully consistent with basic principles of the law 
of secured transactions; indeed, the control concept can usefully be regarded as 
merely a generalization from several specific rules that have long been part of the law 
of securities and secured transactions . . . .”); WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND ET AL., UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES:  REVISED ARTICLE 8 INVESTMENT SECURITIES § 8-106:4 (2018) 
(control by agreement “is, in essence, the indirect holding system analog of a 
transaction in which a debtor pledges bearer securities to a lender”).  See also U.C.C 
§ 9-207(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2017) (rights such as repledge of secured party having 
“possession or control”).  In terms of its breadth, control, unlike possession, is available 
for property that is completely intangible.  E.g., id. §§ 8-106(c)–(d), (f) (uncertificated 
and indirectly held securities); § 9-104 (bank accounts and commodity accounts). 
 260. E.g., Obsolescence:  Hardware and Media, DIG. PRES. MGMT., 
http://www.dpworkshop.org/dpm-eng/oldmedia/obsolescence2.html (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2018) (discussing how the hardware evolution, including USB keys and CD 
drives, forces floppy disc based peripherals into obsolescence). 
 261. Jim Motavalli, Hybrid Cars May Include Fake Vroom for Safety, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 
2009) http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/14/automobiles/14hybrid.html. 
 262. Recalling children’s use of metonymy in the absence of adult vocabularies and 
experience, we can note that Justice Scalia did not have these children’s excuses.  See 
supra notes 187–189 and accompanying text. 
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become dead, as just discussed.  So one can imagine law and indeed all of 
civilization being assailed by relentless armies of zombie metonymies—
but collectively we have managed to keep them at bay.  Except in Burnham. 
CONCLUSION:  PRESENCE AS ANOTHER MERE “ANCIENT FORM” 
Judges of any era (including our own) are limited by an entirely 
natural and human inability to see the future.  Accordingly, the cases of 
the past must be seen as having been written for their own day, and 
should apply to their facts while being potentially subject to change 
when new facts arise.  The modern common-law method is well adapted 
to this reality.  But Justice Scalia’s Burnham opinion behaves in a wooden 
way that ignores these basic aspects of judging.  The argument here is 
that Justice Scalia made a cognitive error, by accepting at face value the 
once-legitimate metonymy of an earlier era and by doggedly clinging to 
it despite enormous changes in the circumstances that animated the 
metonymy in the first place.  Part II.A showed that metonymy is largely 
about cognitive convenience and, on the jurisprudential level, Justice 
Scalia’s emphasis on a defendant’s simple physical presence when 
served is certainly convenient for judges.  It saves them all of the 
analytical work that would be required in assessing the factual fabric of 
the situation, if International Shoe’s standard-like approach were to be 
required.263  In this way, the Burnham opinion is consistent with many of 
the other opinions that Justice Scalia has left us.264 
By calling into question what the pre-Pennoyer judges really would have 
meant by presence, if the judges had had the experience and vocabulary 
of our later age, this Article hoists Justice Scalia on his own originalist 
petard.  Originalists look at the law at an earlier point in time and accept 
it as having a fixed meaning that should control today, as Justice Scalia 
does in Burnham, with his asserted understanding of personal 
                                               
 263. See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text. 
 264. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:  THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 15–28 (2012) (discussing the contrast between textualism 
and opposing schools of judicial thought); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice 
Scalia:  A Critical Appraisal, 22 HAW. L. REV. 385, 385 (2000) (criticizing Scalia’s 
understanding of the Constitution as having a single, ascertainable meaning); Megan 
McDermott, Justice Scalia’s Bankruptcy Jurisprudence:  The Right Judicial Philosophy for the Modern 
Bankruptcy Code?, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 939, 939 (2017) (explaining that Scalia’s bankruptcy 
decisions reflect a uniform judicial philosophy); William D. Popkin, An “Internal” Critique of 
Justice Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1992) (noting 
that Scalia consistently applied a “text-and-rule-based approach” to statutory interpretation 
rather than “traditional case by case common law judging”). 
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jurisdiction at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment.  But this Article 
probes even further into the past, seeking to excavate beneath the 
originalists’ temporal stopping points, in order to reveal how those 
points, themselves, came to be.  One could puckishly call this technique 
“original intent.”  The goal here is far from accepting any prior 
understanding as being authoritative; rather the goal is to expose the 
thinking processes that shaped those prior understandings, the better 
to evaluate whether we wish to accept that prior, subconscious, thinking 
today.  There is no reason to think that the pre-Pennoyer judges were 
more self-conscious or free from subconscious imaginative forms of 
reasoning than all of us are today; and if those early judges’ focus on 
presence was really just a metonymy of PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS, then 
today’s judges’ perpetuation of that metonymy despite the changed 
social circumstances is nothing more or less than zombie jurisprudence.  
Today’s judges can and often do reject longstanding precedents; they 
can and often do rule longstanding statutes to be unenforceable; and 
similarly, they can, and should, be open to changing our acceptance of 
metaphors or metonymies from long ago.265 
The Shaffer Court brought International Shoe’s minimum contacts standard 
to bear on in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction chiefly by recognizing that 
distinguishing those bases from in personam jurisdiction was an “ancient 
                                               
 265. To the extent the unpacking of “presence” to reveal a looser conception of 
contacts is political at all, it tends to be liberal rather than conservative, because it 
leaves open to today’s judges the possibility of protecting relatively weak defendants 
against “outer limits” of tag jurisdiction that may be even broader than the Brennan 
opinion suspects.  See supra notes 109–114 and accompanying text.  By the same token 
(and fitting well with the above notion of “original intent”), original intent itself is no 
longer just a tool for conservative argumentation.  See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, 
AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION:  THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 
(2012) (suggesting that the Constitution invites recourse beyond its text and the 
results can support outcomes like the outlawing of racial segregation and the 
upholding of abortion rights); SCOTT GERBER, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS:  THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 194 (1995) 
(using John Locke’s influence on the Framers to conclude, for example, that “there is 
a constitutional right to basic education, health care, food, housing, and clothing”); 
Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 292 (2007) 
(defending Roe v. Wade with an originalist methodology); Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. 
Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 240 (2009) (demonstrating the variety of 
stances among originalists and suggesting that originalism is more a rhetorical code 
than a political commitment); Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity:  
Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1256 (1997) 
(propounding a “semantic originalism” that is independent of the framers’ concrete 
and context-dependent expectations).  
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form without substantial modern justification.”266  By exactly the same token, 
this Article’s exploration of the PRESENCE FOR CONTACTS metonymy shows 
that the service-while-present rule is also a mere “ancient form without 
substantial modern justification.”267  The service-while-present rule is 
“ancient” because adopted by the pre-Pennoyer judges.  It is a “form” because 
it is based on a superficial linguistic articulation, that is, a dead metonymy, 
perpetuated in Burnham as a zombie metonymy.  And it is “without 
substantial modern justification” because the enormous changes in social 
conditions between the mid-nineteenth century and modern times have 
enabled mere transient presence to be dissociated from substantive contacts.268 
Earlier in his compelling essay from which this Article’s epigraph is 
taken, Nietzsche asks us to question whether linguistic conventions are 
“really the products of knowledge.”269  He asks pointedly, “Do the 
designations and the things coincide?”270  The presence for contacts 
metonymy explored in this Article is a powerful case study that 
highlights and elaborates on Nietzsche’s doubts.  In fact, looking back 
at the epigraph, with deeper appreciation now, Nietzsche’s contention 
that “truth” is really just a “mobile army of . . . metonyms” that “after 
long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory”271 can sometimes apply 
with devastating force to rules of law.  Legal rules are linguistic 
constructs developed by judges and other human beings; the rules don’t 
fall from the sky.  To be sure, the service-while-present rule has a long 
and honorable history; unfortunately, this rule, “after long use,” also 
came to “seem firm, canonical and obligatory” to the late Justice Scalia.  
His Burnham opinion animates the rule with an artificially prolonged 
half-life as if the rule did, in fact, fall from the sky.  The time has long 
passed for the rule, and Justice Scalia’s zombie reasoning, to be replaced 
by a later, more mature, linguistic construct.  The tide of history—with 
its changing “sum of human relations”272—demands it. 
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